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Public Relations Litigation
Kishanthi Parella*†
Conventional wisdom holds that lawsuits harm a corporation’s
reputation. So why do corporations and other businesses litigate even when they
will likely lose in the court of law and the court of public opinion? One
explanation is settlement: some parties file lawsuits not to win but to force the
defendant to pay out. But some business litigants defy even this explanation;
they do not expect to win the lawsuit or to benefit financially from settlement.
What explains their behavior?
The answer is reputation. This Article explains that certain types of
litigation can improve a business litigant’s reputation in the eyes of its key
constituents—constituents that help it succeed in the marketplace. It is their
changed views of the litigant—and subsequent actions taken based on those
changed views—that provide the financial benefit from a lawsuit that the court
may not deliver. For example, technology companies use patent litigation to
discourage employee flight, consumer products companies may use litigation to
affect consumers’ opinions about competitors, and some corporate plaintiffs may
even use litigation to address reputational harm following a crisis. In all these
examples, business litigants may benefit from the reputational effects of the
litigation even if they lose in court.
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This Article makes two contributions. Descriptively, it challenges the
conventional wisdom that lawsuits are always bad for business by revealing
hidden incentives found outside the courthouse that are neglected in the
standard explanation for litigant behavior. Specifically, it explains how
litigation can contribute to reputation-building through signaling or framing
strategies. It also describes how this reputation-building can result in different
types of distributed gains: interparty, intertemporal, and interinstitutional.
Practically, it highlights that the legal rules that could address this reputationbuilding may lack utility due to the timing of reputational effects in litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that lawsuits often harm a party’s reputation. As
this Article explains, however, litigation can also offer reputational
benefits for business litigants even if they do not prevail in court. This
is because businesses depend on resources from a variety of actors,
including suppliers, investors, employees, consumers, and even local
communities.1 The publicity around litigation can affect these actors’
perceptions of the corporate parties and influence their decisions about
whether to provide or withhold their particular resource.2 It is these
actors’ changed views of the business litigant—and the subsequent
actions those changed views prompt—that provide the financial benefit
that the court may not directly deliver.
For example, some companies use patent litigation to gain a
reputation for litigiousness that discourages employees from defecting
to a rival.3 One CEO of such a company “reportedly issued a blanket
order to his general counsel to file two IP lawsuits per quarter to

1.
See, e.g., JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 2 (1978):
[N]o organization is completely self-contained. Organizations are embedded in an
environment comprised of other organizations. They depend on those other
organizations for the many resources they themselves require. Organizations are linked
to environments by federations, associations, customer-supplier relationships,
competitive relationships, and a social-legal apparatus defining and controlling the
nature and limits of these relationships. Organizations must transact with other
elements in their environment to acquire needed resources . . . .
2.
See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobacci, On the Interaction Between Legal and Reputational
Sanctions, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 189, 190–91 (2014).
3.
Martin Ganco et al., More Stars Stay, but the Brightest Ones Still Leave: Job Hopping in
the Shadow of Patent Enforcement, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 659, 660 (2015) (explaining that patent
enforcement is a reputation-building strategy for plaintiff corporations because it is costly and
observable, signaling to current employees that the corporation will litigate to defend its
intellectual property and thereby discouraging employees from leaving the corporation to join or
form a competitor).
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dissuade engineers from ‘walking out the door’ with proprietary
technologies.”4 Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”) also engage in
litigation even if they expect to lose money on the lawsuit in order to
develop a similar reputation for litigiousness.5 For them, victory is not
offered by a court but by the court’s audience; by demonstrating that
they will litigate, plaintiffs persuade other companies to license even
those patents that are very broad and likely invalid.6 In the defamation
context, corporations file lawsuits in response to unfavorable online
reviews in order to send a message to the public, refuting the
allegations, and to investors, assuring them that the corporation is
stable.7 What all these examples have in common is that victory, and
its associated financial rewards, does not come from a court but from
outside it.8 Reputational benefits may provide the missing value in an
otherwise negative expected value lawsuit.9 And these reputational
benefits may grow further because of social media and online access,
which have expanded the public audience for litigation. In addition to
reading excerpts from filings in news stories, the public can also read
full court filings made available online by news media or, sometimes,
the parties themselves.10 The link between the courts of law and public
4.
Rajshree Agarwal et al., Reputations for Toughness in Patent Enforcement: Implications
for Knowledge Spillovers Via Inventor Mobility, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1349, 1350 (2009).
5.
Erik Hovenkamp, Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion Entities Use
Reputation to Monetize Bad Patents 1, 3 (Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2308115 [https://perma.cc/2ZUH-JLKU] (explaining that patent
litigation may persuade potential targets to accept licensing terms by establishing a credible threat
of future litigation).
6.
Id. (manuscript at 2).
7.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
DUKE L.J. 855, 877 (2000). In libel litigation,
[p]laintiffs do not have to sue to win; they can win by suing. Ultimate judicial victory
would be desirable, but not necessary. The suit is a symbolic means of vindicating the
claim of falsehood, and it is the act of suit that largely accomplishes this. While very
few plaintiffs win, and the incidence of judicial victory is smallest with public officials,
the vast majority of plaintiffs who lost indicate that they would sue again, knowing
what happened . . . .
Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71
IOWA L. REV. 226, 228–29 (1985).
8.
See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 487 (2004)
(“The lawyers’ and plaintiffs’ interest in the lawsuit is not solely winning or losing in court, but in
getting their message out to the broader public or a particular group.”).
9.
Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–5) (explaining how reputational benefits of
patent litigation compensate for lawsuits that are unlikely to succeed).
10. The relationship between social media and litigation is not unilateral. While litigation
can fuel social media activity, social media activity can also increase the possibility and affect the
outcomes of litigation by increasing the information available to attorneys. Andy Radhakant &
Matthew Diskin, How Social Media Are Transforming Litigation, LITIG. J. (Spring 2013),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation_journal/2012_13/spring/soc
ial-media-transformation [https://perma.cc/PT3L-BEJJ]:
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opinion are becoming even tighter so that acts undertaken in the former
are more likely to resonate in the latter.11
All these examples illustrate the different ways that litigation
functions as a reputation-building activity for a corporation or other
business party, influencing how its constituents and rivals view it and
subsequently interact with it. This Article addresses two questions that
stem from this understanding: first, how does litigation help build a
business’s reputation, and second, how do businesses benefit from this
reputation building?
First, litigation can build a party’s reputation through signaling
or framing. Each of these mechanisms communicate information
concerning the litigant to a broader audience than the court; this
information can influence the way that third-party actors perceive the
litigant. However, these mechanisms differ on the types of information
revealed. Each mechanism, then, provides a different answer to the
question, “A reputation for what?”
Reputation building through signaling occurs when the act of
filing a lawsuit is the salient information that builds a litigant’s
reputation. This information often helps to build a plaintiff’s reputation
as litigious or willing and able to file a lawsuit. This reputation makes
the plaintiff’s future threat to sue more credible, thereby increasing the
odds that a future party will acquiesce to the plaintiff’s demands rather
than go to court.12 In contrast, reputation building through framing
occurs when the content of the legal narrative is the relevant
information that influences how stakeholders view plaintiffs (and
possibly defendants). Here, the salient information is not the fact that
the plaintiff filed the lawsuit but the information that the lawsuit

[O]nline profiles often provide treasure troves of information about parties, lawyers,
witnesses, experts, and even judges. The openness of social media—and users’
willingness to tweet and post things they would never dream of saying in a letter or an
email—means that social networks offer rich repositories of potential pre-litigation
intelligence and fodder for cross-examination.;
id. (“Clients can jeopardize privilege and, in some cases, have been held to have waived it by
tweeting, blogging, or posting information about their cases.”).
11. However, the resort to private arbitration and other forms of litigation confidentiality
may compromise the flow of information from courts of law to the court of public opinion. See
Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s New Rules
Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (2004); Minna J. Kotkin, Secrecy
in Context: The Shadowy Life of Civil Rights Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 583–84 (2006);
Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of CourtBased Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 528 (2006).
12. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 3) (explaining that “many of the most
litigious PAEs’ are in fact engaging in a profitable strategy of predatory patent litigation, and that
this is actually the most effective way to monetize bad patents.”).
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reveals about the parties.13 Certainly, discovery may influence parties’
reputations, but early-stage litigation documents may also attract
media attention and thereby communicate differing narratives
concerning the parties’ acts.
Through either mechanism, litigation can help a business
litigant influence its reputation. This prompts the second question: How
does this reputation building benefit the party, especially if it loses in
court? This Article argues that reputational gains can come in three
varieties:
intertemporal,
interparty,
and
interinstitutional.
Intertemporal gains are benefits separated in time. A business or other
actor may receive only a fraction of the benefit of its action at a moment
in time; it enjoys the rest of the benefit once that benefit “matures” in
the future. In the litigation context, Party A may lose a lawsuit against
Party B, but that is not the end of the story; Party A may win in the
long term if the reputational effect of the lawsuit influences its
interactions with Party B in the future, whether in the courtroom or
outside of it. Its willingness to litigate may make its future threat to
sue more credible, which can benefit it in its future interactions with
Party B or, more likely, Party C.14 Reputational gains are often
interparty, so that the reputational gains are produced in an interaction
with one party but enjoyed against another. Party A may lose a
particular lawsuit against Party B concerning a low-stakes issue, but
the reputational gain from that lawsuit (through signaling or framing)
is the real benefit that Party A gains, assuming its reputational change
allows it to extract something of value from Party C in the future.
Finally, interinstitutional gains occur when the benefits are created on
one playing field but enjoyed on another. For example, the parties may
battle it out in a lawsuit but feel the real consequences in public opinion
or at the negotiating table. While distinct, these gains often overlap.
This insight is both familiar and new. Approximately two
hundred years ago, Jeremy Bentham explained, “Under the auspices of
publicity, the cause in the court of law, and the appeal to the court of
public opinion, are going on at the same time.”15 Bentham defined
13. Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 910 (2018) (“[L]itigation
releases information about organizational conduct into the public domain.”).
14. See Ganco et al., supra note 3, at 660 (“[P]atent enforcement [is] a reputation-building
strategy rather than a particular tactic launched against a particular target: by engaging in costly
and observable litigious action, firms build reputations for being tough in safeguarding their
intellectual property (IP).”); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry
Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280, 281 (1982) (explaining how predation against the first new
entrant by the incumbent firm builds its reputation as a predator that may discourage other new
entrants in the future); Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 3).
15. JEREMY BENTHAM, Publicity in Courts of Justice, in BETHAMIANA: OR SELECT EXTRACTS
FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 139 (John Hill Burton ed., 1844).
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public opinion as a “system of law, emanating from the body of the
people.”16 Like its judicial counterpart, the court of public opinion also
judges individuals and organizations for their acts and provides
penalties or awards based on those judgments.17 Unlike law courts,
however, its enforcement is purely reputational: it levies reputational
losses on those judged harshly and bestows reputational gains on those
judged well.18 While separate, activities in one court can still influence
outcomes in the other.19

16. Id. at 48; see also Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the
Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1018–19 (2018):
A “public” is a specific kind of social organization that arises within the “public sphere”
by uniting strangers through common exposure to common texts. . . . [T]he people who
comprise publics do not meet in the public street or in the public square, but instead
“are all sitting in their own homes scattered over a vast territory, reading the same
newspaper.”
(quoting JOHN B. THOMPSON, THE MEDIA AND MODERNITY: A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE MEDIA 126–
27 (1995)); id. at 1023 (“Reading newspapers brought the masses into the circle of conversation
that produced public opinion . . . .”).
17. Fred Cutler, Jeremy Bentham and the Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321,
328 (1999).
18. See id. Much of Bentham’s discussion of public opinion is devoted to its role in checking
abuses of political power. Id. at 322. However, the “Public Opinion Tribunal” has broader
jurisdiction and this Article examines its effects on reputational judgments of private as opposed
to public actors.
19. See Tamar Frankel, Court of Law and Court of Public Opinion: Symbiotic Regulation of
the Corporate Management Duty of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 353, 361 (2007) (“[T]his restatement
of the law is addressed to the media and the public as well. It influences, if not guides them, to the
final judgment. It points to the Court of Public Opinion.”). Each court can serve as a check on the
other. Courts of law check the court of public opinion regarding information that is already in the
public but may be incorrect. See, e.g., Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal
System Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1194, 1196 (2016) (“Contrary
to the common assumption, law and reputation are not independent of each other, but rather
complement each other. The legal system’s reaction to misbehavior affects the market reaction.”
(footnote omitted)). However, our legal tradition has a long-rooted faith in the role and importance
of the court of public opinion serving as a disciplining mechanism for the conduct of participants
in the courts of the law. According to Jeremy Bentham, publicity encourages witnesses to be
truthful in their courtroom testimony. BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 115 (“Environed as he sees
himself by a thousand eyes, contradiction, should he hazard a false tale, will seem ready to rise up
in opposition to it from a thousand mouths.”); see also Adriaan Lanni, Publicity and the Courts of
Classical Athens, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 119, 127–29 (2012) (describing the disciplining effect of
publicity on jurors). Publicity also disciplines those holding high judicial office and serves as
society’s primary form of security against abuses of government power. See BENTHAM, supra note
15, at 115 (“[Publicity] keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.”); see also Gerald J.
Postema, The Soul of Law, in BENTHAM’S THEORY OF LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION 46–48 (Xiaobo Zhai
& Michael Quinn eds., 2014) (discussing the ways that publicity ensures public oversight over
government actors); Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and
Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 15–24 (2011) (explaining how Bentham thought
publicity facilitated accountability). In Bentham’s view, the “primary leverage” used by the public
to ensure accountability of government actors was “manipulation of reputation or esteem. Public
condemnation threatened an official’s reputation.” Postema, supra, at 52; see also Lobel, supra
note 8, at 487–89 (“ ‘[L]itigation is one of the most effective ways to win publicity for a cause.’
Public interest litigators and organizations have come to view litigation as a vehicle for attracting
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For decades, public interest lawyers heeded Bentham’s insight
by harnessing the publicity effects of litigation to pressure powerful
social actors to change.20 But this exposition of public relations
litigation leads to an incomplete picture of the phenomena because it
generally focuses on plaintiffs litigating for primarily public benefit.
Society is therefore more likely to perceive public relations litigation as
socially beneficial. What is missing—and what this Article offers—is a
better understanding of how these strategies are employed at the other

the media. . . . Often, litigation attracts the media’s attention in a way that nothing else does.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 58 (1994))). Bentham acknowledges that exercise of the Public
Opinion Tribunal’s functions is dependent on news media:
They are the real force by which information—including reports of government
activities, proceedings of the legislature, and opinions (“suffrages”) of the people—is
collected, sifted through, and publicized in an accessible form. . . . The claimant and
accused provide statements, correspondents to the editor provide evidence as witnesses,
and then the editor essentially writes an editorial on the subject. After this debate-trial
has run its course, the judgment of public opinion is converted into action, but only
indirectly . . . .
Cutler, supra note 17, at 330–31.
20. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: THEORY OF LAW
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 214 (1978) (explaining how social reform groups used legal
proceedings to create unfavorable publicity that forced parties into settlement); Emily Chiang,
Institutional Reform Shaming, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 59–61 (2015) (describing similar
strategies); Lobel, supra note 8, at 489; Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 959–62 (2007)
(discussing effects of litigation on social mobilization); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through
Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (discussing the benefits to social movements from losing
litigation battles).
One notable historical example is the Scopes Trial. See Perry Parks, Summer for the Scientists?
The Scopes Trial and the Pedagogy of Journalism, 92 JOURNALISM MASS COMM. Q. 444, 444–45
(2015) (examining how the press contributed to educating the public about evolution during the
Scopes Trial). The trial was also important because it attracted “up to two hundred reporters and
included the first live radio broadcast from a courtroom.” Id. at 445. The media framed the trial
using narratives that were sure to get people’s attention, such as portraying it “as a clash of
multiple values—religion versus science, urban enlightenment versus rural ignorance, Northern
freethinking versus Southern fundamentalism.” Id.
For contemporary examples, consider Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, in which the
plaintiff, the Colorado River Ecosystem, requested that a federal court recognize and declare that
it “is capable of possessing rights similar to a ‘person’ ” and therefore has rights “to exist, flourish,
regenerate, naturally evolve, and be restored.” Amended Complaint For Declaratory & Injunctive
Relief at 3, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No.1:17-cv-02316 (D. Colo. dismissed Dec. 4, 2017),
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-docu
ments/2017/20171106_docket-117-cv-02316_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8RP-BGTD].
Similarly, Naruto v. Slater (the “Monkey Selfie” case), concerned whether nonhumans (such as
monkeys) could have intellectual property rights under the law. 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018).
According to People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”), this case was important
because it “sparked a massive international discussion about the need to extend fundamental
rights to animals for their own sake—not in relation to the ways in which they can be exploited by
humans.” Zachary Toliver, Settlement Reached: ‘Monkey Selfie’ Case Broke New Ground for Animal
Rights, PETA (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.peta.org/blog/settlement-reached-monkey-selfie-casebroke-new-ground-animal-rights [https://perma.cc/8W52-BU9C].
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end of the spectrum: for-profit parties using the litigation stage for
primarily private benefits. These parties are two sides of the same coin;
both types use litigation as a stage to reach particular audiences, albeit
different ones.
This Article offers a framework for understanding how litigation
can help manage reputation in yet another arena for public relations:
post-crisis situations that occur in the wake of a financial scandal, data
breach, product accident, or other reputational crisis. Litigation often
occurs in such situations, but it responds not only to the actual injuries
that such incidents may cause but also to the information vacuum these
incidents create and the reputational consequences that result if the
vacuum is allowed to grow.21 This Article offers a framework for
understanding when we might expect to witness the reputational
effects of post-crisis litigation. It explains that reputational effects
depend on both proximity and organizational similarity between the
parties. Depending on these factors, post-crisis litigation can help
businesses “in the hot seat” achieve both economic and reputational
objectives.
The framework that this Article offers has descriptive, practical,
and normative implications. Descriptively, it helps to better understand
litigant benefits that flow from lawsuits. The public generally assumes
that parties initiate litigation to receive rewards—usually financial—
from a court in response to a legal harm incurred.22 Litigant conduct
becomes more difficult to explain in cases when parties are unlikely to
win.23 This Article explains how the court of public opinion matters for
understanding litigant behavior and how ignoring it results in an
incomplete picture of litigation.
Practically, this analysis illustrates the disparity in timing
between the filing of reputational lawsuits and the law’s tools for

21. See Craig Deegan, The Legitimising Effect of Social and Environmental Disclosures—A
Theoretical Foundation, 15 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282, 296 (2002) (discussing the
strategic use of information disclosure by corporations in the wake of crises to reestablish
legitimacy); David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social
Reporting: Implementing a Standard of Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, 17 BUS. ETHICS
Q. 5, 8 (2007) (“[R]esearchers using legitimacy theory hypothesize that firms report information
only when needed to maintain or repair their legitimacy within the community. Greater
stakeholder awareness of any particular firm’s negative social performance leads to the need for
that firm to engage in legitimacy maintenance activities, which include disclosure.”).
22. See Robert G. Bone, Economics of Civil Procedure, in 3 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 148 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (“In this model, parties make litigation choices that
maximize their expected value.”).
23. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-Expected-Value Suits, in
PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 341 (Chris Sanchirico ed., 2d ed. 2012) (outlining potential
theories as to why litigants pursue suits that they will likely lose); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
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dismissing them (or otherwise discouraging them). Many business
litigants hit their reputational mark upon filing the lawsuit; dismissals
do not undermine that reputational victory. While a dismissal can
protect a defendant from a frivolous lawsuit in a court of law, it does
not similarly protect the defendant from harm in the court of public
opinion. This insight is important because strategies designed to reduce
unwanted lawsuits will fail if they do not account for litigant incentives
that originate from public opinion. Normatively, this Article challenges
us to consider the relationship between the “two courts” of law and
public opinion and encourages us to identify the reputational
dimensions of everyday litigation.
Part I explains how reputation provides the value in a lawsuit
and illustrates this explanation with various examples where corporate
plaintiffs benefit from the reputational effects of litigation. Part II
builds on these examples with an in-depth study of how post-crisis
litigation can address reputational damage for business litigants. This
Part first provides a theoretical framework for understanding when
reputational effects should be expected and then introduces two
illustrative examples that demonstrate this framework. Part III
investigates three reasons why litigation creates reputational effects:
relationship to media, information environments, and aggregation.
Finally, Part IV explores the types of reputational gains that litigation
can produce and the limitations of current legal rules for discouraging
public relations litigation deemed socially undesirable.
I. REPUTATION BUILDING THROUGH LITIGATION: SIGNALING
Assuming that businesses act rationally, we can expect them to
engage in litigation when they obtain, or expect to obtain, positive value
from a lawsuit.24 Because this discussion focuses on business parties,
this value is understood as financial gain—although individual
plaintiffs do file lawsuits for a variety of nonfinancial reasons.25 If this

24. Bone, supra note 22, at 148. One explanation for where this value originates is
settlements. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Klement, supra note 23; William H.J. Hubbard, Sinking Costs to
Force or Deter Settlement, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 545, 548–53 (2016); Rosenberg & Shavell, supra
note 23.
25. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 98 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“[T]ort offered Mitchell the
same thing that revenge did. It offered him a way of countering the message that Alcorn’s spit
sent, a way of correcting the historical significance of Alcorn’s wrong.”); Larissa Katz, Spite and
Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1456–59
(2013) (surveying cases that were motivated by animus); see also Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic
Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2011) (describing “strategic spillovers” as situations
where “parties . . . employ externalities opportunistically as a type of extortion”).
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financial gain does not come from the courtroom, then it must come
from outside of it.
This Part explains how reputational effects may provide the
missing value in a lawsuit that otherwise appears to lack it.26 When
business litigants do not obtain financial benefits from a judicial
remedy or settlement, they may still obtain important reputational
gains through the publicity around a lawsuit. These reputational gains
can lead to indirect financial benefits for a business litigant by affecting
its competitiveness in the marketplace. Specifically, information from
litigation can reach particular audiences that are important to a
corporation’s success: employees, competitors, consumers, civil society,
investors, and future contracting partners. These lawsuits have the
potential to influence the reputation of the business litigant in the eyes
of these actors, thereby affecting their decisions to interact with the
business. It is these reputational effects—and the financial benefits
that may result—that supply the otherwise absent positive value to
some puzzling lawsuits. This Part begins with a brief introduction to
corporate reputation and then provides examples of how different types
of lawsuits can help business litigants, particularly plaintiffs, achieve
reputational gains even if they lose in court.
A. Reputation as a Strategic Asset
According to reputation expert Charles Fombrun, a “corporate
reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions
and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all of its
key constituents when compared with leading rivals.”27 A corporation’s
key constituents include not only consumers but also investors,
employees, and communities.28 A corporation can rise or fall based on

26. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–5) (describing how the reputational
effects of predatory patent litigation compensate for an otherwise unprofitable lawsuit).
27. CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE IMAGE 72
(1996); see also David L. Deephouse, Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration of
Mass Communication and Resource-Based Theories, 26 J. MGMT. 1091, 1093 (2000) (“A firm’s
reputation is produced by the interactions of the firm with its stakeholders and by information
about the firm and its actions circulated among stakeholders, including specialized information
intermediaries.”); Yuri Mishina, Emily S. Block & Michael J. Mannor, The Path Dependence of
Organizational Reputation: How Social Judgment Influences Assessments of Capability &
Character, 33 STRAT. MGMT. J. 459, 460 (2012) (“Organizational reputation is defined as the
collective, stakeholder group-specific assessment regarding an organization’s capability to create
value based on its characteristics and qualities.” (citations omitted)); Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 693–95
(1986) (discussing reputation as property).
28. FOMBRUN, supra note 27, at 61.
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what these different actors think of it.29 This is because these actors
provide a corporation with something it needs in order to succeed:
consumers provide revenue, investors provide capital, employees
provide talent, and communities provide the social license to operate. A
corporate reputation influences these actors’ decisions to provide or
withhold their resources; therefore, reputation has important
competitive consequences.
Corporate reputations are important to consumers because a
reputation might be the only information a consumer has about a
corporation before the consumer purchases a good or service from it.30
Prospective employees also care about corporate reputations because
they want to know whether a corporate employer will treat them well
and reward their work.31 Prospective suppliers care about whether a
corporation will fulfill its contractual obligations in good faith.32 And
corporations depend on relationships with local communities and
government actors.33
While reputations are important, they are not self-created; a
reputation is a product of what others think.34 A person or corporation
29. Id. at 81 (“Corporate reputations have bottom-line effects. A good reputation enhances
profitability because it attracts customers to the company’s products, investors to its securities,
and employees to its jobs. In turn, esteem inflates the price at which a public company’s securities
trade.”).
30. Michael L. Barnett & Andrew J. Hoffman, Beyond Corporate Reputation: Managing
Reputational Interdependence, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 1, 4 (2008); Morten Thanning Vendelø,
Narrating Corporate Reputation: Becoming Legitimate Through Storytelling, 28 INT’L STUD.
MGMT. & ORG. 120, 120 (1998); see also Hess & Dunfee, supra note 21, at 17 (explaining
information asymmetries between firms and stakeholders).
31. See John Dodge, The War for Tech Talent Escalates, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/02/19/the-war-for-tech-talent-escalates/ejUSbuPCjP
LCMRYlRZIKoJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/2U5A-88P2] (describing the fierce competition for
software engineers and other employees in Massachusetts’s tech industry).
32. Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 606 (2015) (“[E]ven firms as powerful as Apple
are deeply concerned about their reputation for treating suppliers fairly.”).
33. See, e.g., Nicholas Bariyo & Jacquie McNish, Tanzania’s Tougher Mining Laws Rattle
Companies, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tanzanias-tougher-mininglaws-rattles-companies-1501666200 [https://perma.cc/C2YV-KSEA] (reporting that mining
companies in Tanzania confront increasing pressure from the government, including export bans;
restrictions on foreign travel; and demands for billions of dollars in back taxes, penalties, and
interest); Tsvetana Paraskova, Nigerian Protesters Storm Shell Crude Oil Flow Station,
OILPRICE.COM (Aug. 11, 2017), https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/NigerianProtesters-Storm-Shell-Crude-Oil-Flow-Station.html [https://perma.cc/Q9KS-XBJ8] (describing
how hundreds of protesters attacked a Shell-owned crude flow station, “protesting against lack of
jobs, demanding infrastructure development, . . . asking for an end to oil pollution in the Niger
Delta[,] and claim[ing] that they were not benefiting from the oil-rich resources in the restive
area”).
34. FOMBRUN, supra note 27, at 59; E. Geoffrey Love & Matthew Kraatz, Character,
Conformity, or the Bottom Line? How and Why Downsizing Affected Corporate Reputation, 52
ACAD. MGMT. J. 314, 314 (2009) (“Corporate reputation is an important asset (or liability) bestowed
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can influence its own reputation but cannot author it.35 Instead, a
corporation shapes its reputation by affecting the views of others
concerning itself.
B. Discouraging Rivals: Signals to New Entrants
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts investigated the threat of
predation by incumbent firms against new entrants and explained that
predation is profitable even if it does not result in immediate exit by a
rival because acts of predation provide an incumbent with a reputation
for predation that can discourage entry into the market by new firms.36
It is this reputation that is valuable because it “leads potential entrants
to anticipate that the incumbent firm will behave similarly if they
should enter, and, thus, entry appears less attractive to them.”37
Potential entrants rely on an incumbent’s reputation for predation
when evaluating entry because they suffer from information
asymmetries and are “unsure about one another’s options or
motivation.”38 Therefore, new entrants predict future behavior on the
basis of past conduct;39 an observable record of predation by the market
incumbent against previous entrants suggests to new entrants that
they would encounter a similar response.
Milgrom and Roberts’s explanation of reputation building
through signaling is useful for understanding certain litigation
strategies that similarly depend on reputational effects. For example, a
plaintiff corporation may use a lawsuit to discourage competition from
a market rival. In 2015, Gillette brought a lawsuit against four former
employees who Gillette claimed had misappropriated its trade secrets
to develop products for ShaveLogic (also a defendant).40 In response,
upon a firm by external audiences.” (citation omitted)); Stelios Zyglidopoulos & Nelson Phillips,
Responding to Reputational Crises: A Stakeholder Perspective, 2 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 333, 335
(1999) (“Reputation is, therefore, fundamentally a stakeholder-based concept; it grows out of a
stakeholder relationship and it is shaped, if not determined, by that relationship.”); see also Post,
supra note 27, at 692 (“The dictionary describes [reputation] as the ‘common or general estimate
of a person with respect to character or other qualities.’ Reputation thus inheres in the social
apprehension that we have of each other.” (footnote omitted)).
35. See, e.g., Parella, supra note 13, at 930–55 (discussing reputational sanctions for
organizational defendants).
36. Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 14, at 281, 284.
37. Id. at 281 (“[P]redation will emerge in our model even if . . . predation against a particular
rival involves losses that cannot be directly recouped in the given market, even were exit to be
induced. Moreover, viability of this predatory strategy does not depend on being able to induce
exit.”).
38. Id. at 304.
39. Id. at 302.
40. Complaint at 1, Gillette Co. v. Provost, No. 15-0149 B, 2015 WL 9911345 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Jan. 16, 2015), 2015 WL 216997.
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ShaveLogic counterclaimed for intentional interference with
prospective business relations, alleging that Gillette had threatened to
file a lawsuit against ShaveLogic and did so knowing that the latter
would have to disclose the fact of the lawsuit to its investors and future
business partners.41 The counterclaim alleged that the fact of a lawsuit
would affect these actors’ perceptions of ShaveLogic and influence their
decision to collaborate with it.42 And ShaveLogic is not alone. The Wall
Street Journal reported that “[t]he case is one of several Gillette has
brought against rival razor companies as the brand cedes market share
to upstarts offering cheaper blades and online delivery,” such as Dollar
Shave Club and Edgewell (Schick-brand razors).43 Gillette asserted
patent infringement claims against both competitors, who denied the
allegations but later settled.44
As the foregoing illustrates, businesses may engage in
reputation building through signaling to reach audiences other than
rivals. Litigation can serve reputation-building functions when the act
of litigating allows a litigant to influence third-party views of itself or
of a rival. These changed views provide reputational benefits when they
influence the ways that the litigant or rival interacts with key
stakeholders.
C. Employees: Discouraging Flight by Employees
Corporations also use litigation, frequently patent enforcement,
to influence their reputations in a way that discourages employees from
fleeing to competitors or starting their own businesses. A major
component of a corporation’s competitive advantage is its employees,
who bring valued skills and expertise to the corporation’s operations.45
The problem is that such employees may leave. Exit is a double loss to
a corporation: a departing employee reduces the skill and knowledge
41. Gillette Co., 2015 WL 9911345, at *1.
42. In its counterclaim against Gillette, ShaveLogic alleged that Gillette sent letters
threatening litigation when it “knew that ShaveLogic was in discussion with marketing and
distribution partners and with potential investors, and would have to disclose those threats as
part of their discussions.” Id. ShaveLogic alleged that one marketing and distribution company
“cut off discussions in November 2014 as soon as it learned of these litigation threats” and that
“[a]t least one investor broke off discussions with ShaveLogic when these threats became known.”
Id. at *3–4.
43. Sharon Terlep, Gillette’s Lawsuit Against Razor Startup ShaveLogic Dismissed, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gillettes-lawsuit-against-razor-startup-shavelogicdismissed-1492803768 [https://perma.cc/DJ2F-G9UC].
44. Id.; Barrett J. Brunsman, P&G Settles Lawsuit with Unilever’s Dollar Shave Club, CINN.
BUS. COURIER (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2019/03/29/p-gsettles-lawsuit-with-unilever-s-dollar-shave.html [https://perma.cc/2YET-FYGZ].
45. Ganco et al., supra note 3, at 659.
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available to the business and the employee may bring it to a rival,
thereby augmenting a competitor’s capacities. For example, as
mentioned above, four former Gillette employees joined a competitor,
ShaveLogic.
In this context, management research suggests that some
corporations cultivate a strong reputation for patent enforcement in
order to retain high-value employees: “[B]y engaging in costly and
observable litigious action, firms build reputations for being tough in
safeguarding their intellectual property,” thereby reducing the value
that employees expect to gain upon departure.46 As such, the patent
enforcement concerns more than the parties to the case.47 This is
especially true when the media, attracted to patent litigation, expands
the audience for the litigation and the implicit messaging contained
therein.48 The expense of patent litigation and the accompanying media
coverage make it a costly and observable action that differentiates
aggressive and passive employers.49 As a consequence, when “firms
develop stronger reputations for litigiousness, employee-inventors
become less likely to join or form rival companies.”50
D. Investors and Civil Society: Responding to Online Defamation
In the age of social media, we are all subject to the risk of
unflattering views. Corporations are no different. Yelp, TripAdvisor,
Amazon, and other platforms allow users to provide public but often
anonymous reviews of a business’s performance; social media outlets,
such as Facebook and Twitter, augment that power. With a few clicks
(or taps, on a smartphone), an irate customer can publish negative
comments, and the increasingly expansive social networks disseminate
those comments to an increasingly expanding audience. Through these
dynamics, a few clicks or taps can potentially threaten a business’s
closely cultivated reputation.

46. See id. at 660, 679 (observing that “an employer’s aggressiveness in patent enforcement
alters the antecedent proclivity of employees to exit”); see also Agarwal et al., supra note 4, at 1367
(“[A] firm’s patent litigiousness significantly curtails the outward dissemination of technological
knowledge that otherwise would be expected from employee departures.”).
47. Ganco et al., supra note 3, at 660 (“[W]e view patent enforcement as a reputation-building
strategy rather than a particular tactic launched against a particular target.”).
48. Id. at 662.
49. Id.
50. Id. This strategy does not succeed with all employees. This same study found that “tough
reputations are particularly influential in retaining employees whose ideas are valuable internally
to the firm although those with the most lucrative prospects for outside advancement are relatively
unaffected.” Id.
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Litigation offers businesses one tool to manage their reputations
in the wake of such public criticism.51 As part of a multifaceted public
relations campaign, defamation lawsuits can aid corporate plaintiffs
since “[c]orporations often issue press releases announcing their
decision to sue those who post on financial bulletin boards, even though
doing so gives more widespread publicity to the defendants’ remarks
than they received at the time they were posted.”52 The “tendency to
publicize the decision to file suit” is important for explaining why some
defamation plaintiffs—who may never expect to win their cases—file
suits nonetheless:
The plaintiffs do not appear to see the result of their lawsuit, alone, as providing relief to
their reputation. They know that victory is unlikely, and that the final decision is likely
in any event to be ambiguous and distant. Instead, plaintiffs see the act of initiating suit,
independent of its result, as an effective and public form of reply or response. By invoking
the formal judicial system, the plaintiffs legitimize their claim of falsity. Reputational
repair follows without the assistance of-indeed in spite of-the judicial system.53

While this insight may be true for a broader range of defamation
plaintiffs, the symbolic value of filing a defamation lawsuit is especially
important to corporate plaintiffs who are sensitive to negative publicity
that may affect their stock prices.54 As a result, “corporations must act
quickly to offset the potentially negative effects of defamatory messages
by offering an alternative version of events. Indeed, failure to respond
may itself be deemed an admission that the negative statements are
true.”55 As such, the existence of the lawsuit sends a message to a
variety of audiences: investors (suggesting that the corporation is
strong and stable, despite the reputational backlash), the public
(refuting the defamatory comments), and even potential future critics
(sending a warning by filing the lawsuit).56 The scholarship on

51. See Jessica Bartlett, Craft Beer Cellar Parent Sues Glassdoor over Negative Reviews, BOS.
BUS. J. (May 22, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2018/05/22/craft-beer-cellarparent-sues-glassdoor-over.html [https://perma.cc/GLV5-52KZ] (“A craft beer retail chain is suing
the employment website Glassdoor over negative comments and ratings on the site that the retail
chain claims are defamatory.”); Beth Landman & Julia Marsh, Woman Hit with Defamation
Lawsuit by Doctor over Negative Yelp Review, FOX NEWS (May 29, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/
health/woman-hit-with-defamation-lawsuit-by-doctor-over-negative-yelp-review [https://perma.cc
/J67Q-HTR5] (“A Manhattan woman who gave one-star reviews on Yelp and ZocDoc to a Kips Bay
gynecologist has spent nearly $20,000 defending herself against a defamation suit filed by the
physician . . . .”).
52. Lidsky, supra note 7, at 876–77 (footnote omitted).
53. Bezanson, supra note 7, at 228.
54. See Lidsky, supra note 7, at 877 (“Corporate plaintiffs are at least partly motivated by
the fear that negative statements on financial bulletin boards will drive down their stock price.”);
Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1167,
1168–69 (1995) (identifying various costs to corporations as a result of defamation).
55. Lidsky, supra note 7, at 877 (footnote omitted).
56. See id. at 880–81:
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defamation suggests that these messages are still salient even if the
prospects for litigation success are slim.57
E. Future Licensees: Sending a Message
Finally, litigation can affect a business’s reputation with future
licensees. In the patent context, PAEs file patent infringement lawsuits
even over “bad patents” that “are likely invalid and ought not to have
been granted in the first place.”58 These plaintiffs sue, despite the very
low likelihood that they will profit from the lawsuit, in order to develop
a reputation for litigiousness.59 This reputation matters because the
targeted company’s decision to acquiesce to the PAE’s demands is
influenced by the latter’s reputation to make good on its litigation
threats, which the targeted company could observe from the PAE’s past
litigation history.60 Therefore, developing a reputation for litigiousness
is important to PAEs because it allows them to financially benefit from
patents that may otherwise have been difficult or impossible to
license.61 This strategy also alters the incentives a lawsuit offers a PAE;
what is at stake in the lawsuit is not necessarily the merits of the
dispute but the PAE’s reputation for litigiousness, because other

Bringing suit sends a message to shareholders and potential investors that they should
not believe all the negative information they hear about the company; it quells rumors
and takes the focus away from the negative press the company has been receiving—
whether true or untrue. Even if the company ultimately decides not to pursue its action
past filing a complaint, it may have won a symbolic victory simply by suing John Doe.
57. See Bezanson, supra note 7, at 228–29 (explaining that “the act of suit” sends out
messages, regardless of the result of a lawsuit).
58. Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 2).
59. See id. (manuscript at 2–3) (“Despite being very experienced in patent litigation, many of
the most litigious PAEs perform relatively poorly in court.”); id. (manuscript at 4) (“[S]ome of the
most litigious PAEs are not dissuaded by the likelihood of losing or the possibility that their
patents will be held invalid.”); id. (manuscript at 5) (“The PAE gains a strong reputation for
aggressive litigation by following through on a litigation threat despite expecting to lose money on
the suit.”).
60. See id. (manuscript at 3):
They can give credibility to their threats by referencing previous situations in which
they have litigated, and their targets can search through public records to discern how
aggressively the PAE has litigated in the past. If the infringement claim is strong, then
the PAE’s threat would be inherently credible. But if its patents are weak, it relies on
evidence of aggressive litigation to give credibility to its threats. Once such credibility
is established, the PAE can persuade its targets to accept demands they would
otherwise reject.
61. Id. (manuscript at 2) (“Despite their legal expertise and substantial resources, some of
the most active and litigious PAEs make their way by asserting bad patents, i.e. patents that are
likely invalid and ought not to have been granted in the first place.”).
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potential defendants observe this reputation of a propensity to litigate
and react by acquiescing to the PAE’s licensing terms.62
*

*

*

The discussion above highlights three distinct lessons for
understanding how business litigants, especially plaintiffs, derive value
from litigation that may not succeed in court. First, the publicity around
litigation can have reputation-enhancing effects for business litigants.
Second, the audience for these reputational effects is not necessarily the
opposing party in the lawsuit; instead, it can be a third-party actor, such
as an investor, employee, or future contracting partner. The fact of the
lawsuit and a business’s litigiousness are the messages that are
directed at these audiences. Finally, these reputational effects can have
real consequences for a business’s competitiveness in the marketplace
by affecting its ability to retain employees, discourage competition, and
assuage investors. It is these effects—and the financial benefits that
may result from these effects—that help to explain the positive value of
lawsuits that may otherwise fail in court. These effects and their
reputational consequences are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1: THE REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS OF BUSINESS LITIGATION
Causes of
Action

Defendant

Third-Party
Audience
New entrant’s
potential
business
partners

Reputational
Effect
Discourages
partnership
with new
entrant
Reduces
employees’
expected value
upon
departure

Unfair Trade
Practices

New entrant

Patent
litigation

Former
employees

Current
employees

Defamation

“John Doe”

Investors and
future critics

Legitimizes
claim of falsity

Patent
infringement

Alleged
infringers

Future
licensees

PAE will
litigate

62. Id. (manuscript at 2–3).

Competitive
Effect
Impedes
ability of new
entrant to
compete
Discourages
employee
flight
Assuages
investors and
warns future
critics
Monetizes
“bad patents”
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II. REPUTATION BUILDING THROUGH LITIGATION: FRAMING
The previous Part described how reputational gains provide
value to business litigants even when those parties lose in court. This
Part builds on this framework by explaining how litigation supplies
reputational benefits in post-crisis situations. It is not surprising that
litigation often follows in the wake of a corporate scandal; in some
situations, however, lawsuits respond not only to economic harms but
also to reputational problems. Section II.A provides a brief discussion
of reputational harm following a crisis and the role of information in
addressing it. Section II.B proposes a framework for understanding
when we can expect particular reputational effects in post-crisis
litigation. Section II.C then presents examples illustrating this
framework.
A. Information: Cause and Cure for Reputational Harm
A good reputation is valuable but not permanent. Reputations
change as consumers and other actors revise their opinions of a
corporation based on new information.63 Unsurprisingly, reputations
can plummet following a corporate scandal.64
A crisis not only threatens the reputation of the corporation in
crisis but can also threaten the reputation of its associates and peers
because of a fundamental information problem: Following a corporate
crisis, the public wants someone to blame. The problem is that it is not
always clear who that party is. The public is not privy to the internal
records, confidential communications, high-level meetings, or other
sources of information that could reveal the identity of the blameworthy
party. Therefore, the public tends to blame all parties involved.65
63. See FOMBRUN, supra note 27, at 59–61 (noting the difficulty that companies have in
creating “enuring and resilient” reputations); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the
Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1424 (2011) (“Reputational harm occurs when
dissemination of information about an individual or entity causes others to form a collective
judgment that has the potential to result in a change in relationship or attitude.”).
64. Tieying Yu & Richard H. Lester, Moving Beyond Firm Boundaries: A Social Network
Perspective on Reputation Spillover, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 94, 95 (2008) (explaining that
reputational crises emerge as a result of accidents, scandals, or financial problems).
65. See Michael L. Barnett, Finding a Working Balance Between Competitive and Communal
Strategies, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1753, 1763 (2006) (“A single act by a single firm can spark a
constituent mobilization that destabilizes the taken-for-granted status of an entire industry.”);
Michael L. Barnett & Andrew A. King, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: A Longitudinal
Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institution, 51 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1150, 1152 (2008) (“[W]hen
new information is revealed about the characteristics of one firm, it reflects to some degree on all
firms within its industry.”); Sheila Goins & Thomas S. Gruca, Understanding Competitive and
Contagion Effects of Layoff Announcements, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 12, 30 (2008)
(“[I]nformation from the actions of one firm sends signals that shareholders incorporate into their
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Consider the recent example of Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica. In 2018, the public learned that Cambridge Analytica
obtained access to private information for more than fifty million
Facebook users.66 Uproar ensued as users, regulators, and citizens
demanded to know what had happened and who was responsible.67 But
placing blame was not simple given that three actors were involved: the
data was accessed by Cambridge Analytica; the application was
developed by a Cambridge University professor, Aleksandr Kogan; and
the information was collected from Facebook.68 Each denied wrongdoing
and blamed the others. However, this scandal engulfed all three actors
and levied significant reputational consequences against each.69
Reputational harm can also spread to industry peers. In these
instances, reputational harm does not spread based on proximity or
contacts but on perceived organizational similarity. Industry peers may
potentially suffer reputational harm as the public wonders whether the
behavior underlying the crisis is an isolated incident or reveals broader

valuations of other companies.”); Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (2015) (“[S]takeholders are asymmetrically informed about the inner workings
of the company.”); Yu & Lester, supra note 64, at 94–95 (explaining “reputational spill-over”); Lori
Qingyuan Yue & Paul Ingram, Industry Self-Regulation as a Solution to the Reputation Commons
Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 279 (Michael L. Barnett &
Timothy G. Pollock eds., 2012) (“[R]eputations are ‘intangible commons’ because organizations
share both the penalties and rewards associated with the reputation of their industries.”).
66. Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Exposed 87 Million Users to Cambridge Analytica, WIRED (Apr.
4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-exposed-87-million-users-to-cambridge-analytica
[https://perma.cc/P4EM-SG8B].
67. Tony Romm & Elizabeth Dwoskin, U.S. Regulators Have Met To Discuss Imposing a
Record-setting Fine Against Facebook for Privacy Violations, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/18/us-regulators-have-met-discuss-imposing
-record-setting-fine-against-facebook-some-its-privacy-violations [https://perma.cc/3MBR-TGXP].
68. Lesley Stahl, Aleksandr Kogan: The Link Between Cambridge Analytic and Facebook, 60
MINUTES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/aleksandr-kogan-the-link-betweencambridge-analytica-and-facebook-60-minutes/ [https://perma.cc/AQ9L-TZFC].
69. For example, Cambridge Analytica filed for bankruptcy following the crisis. Abinaya
Vijayaraghavan & Supantha Mukherjee, Cambridge Analytica Files for Bankruptcy in U.S.
Following Facebook Debacle, REUTERS (May 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscambridge-analytica-bankruptcy/cambridge-analytica-files-for-bankruptcy-in-u-s-following-face
book-debacle-idUSKCN1IJ0IS [https://perma.cc/6AB7-5XUJ]. Mark Zuckerberg faced government
hearings on both sides of the Atlantic, and Facebook is the subject of multiple lawsuits brought by
investors, users, and state regulators. See Jeff John Roberts, Facebook Has Been Hit By Dozens of
Data Lawsuits. And This Could Be Just the Beginning, FORTUNE (Apr. 30, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/04/30/facebook-data-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/5UJP-SBED] (“Facebook
is facing more than three dozen class action lawsuits over Cambridge Analytica.”); Vijayaraghavan
& Mukherjee, supra (stating that both United States congressional committees and the European
Parliament have requested that Mark Zuckerberg testify). Finally, Aleksandr Kogan claims that
all these actors are using him as a scapegoat in the public eye. Matthew Weaver, Facebook
Scandal:
I
Am
Being
Used
as
Scapegoat,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/facebook-row-i-am-being-used-as-scapegoatsays-academic-aleksandr-kogan-cambridge-analytica [https://perma.cc/PPP2-6UXY].
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problems within the industry.70 In other words, is the company under
scrutiny “the one bad apple in the basket,” or “is the whole basket
rotten”?71
But information is not only a source of reputational harm, it is
also a potential cure. Reputational harm spreads to multiple actors
when the public lacks information concerning the facts of the crisis,
such as what happened, why it happened, who was responsible, and
whether it can happen again. Therefore, one way to contain
reputational harm is to supply information concerning these questions,
often through a press release.
A press release is a type of communication “in which writers
provide information to journalists in the hope that it will be passed on
to the general public.”72 It is more likely that a journalist will pick up a
press release when crisis managers draft their releases to meet the
formal requirements of news reporting.73 For example, authors of press

70. See Barnett & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 4 (emphasizing that a firm’s reputation depends
on the actions and reputations of other firms); Yu & Lester, supra note 64, at 98 (“Since
determining the impact of a reputational crisis requires accurate information, in situations of
ambiguity stakeholders might find it difficult to differentiate between individual organizations,
thereby penalizing all organizations that are either proximate or equivalent to the focal
organization equally.”).
71. The Cambridge-Facebook scandal also illustrates the risk of reputational harm between
industry peers, especially regulatory reputational risk. For example, the Senate Judiciary
Committee not only invited Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to testify, it also extended invitations
to the CEOs of Twitter and Google. See Press Release, Office of Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman
Grassley Announces Hearing on the Future of Data Privacy in Social Media (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/chairman-grassley-announces-hearing-futur
e-data-privacy-social-media [https://perma.cc/5B8E-6689]. Not only were industry peers dragged
into the spotlight concerning their own practices but they also share the risk that this crisis could
spark future regulation on data privacy. Christopher Mims, Apple, Amazon and Google Also Are
Bracing for Privacy Regulations, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/appleamazon-and-google-also-are-bracing-for-privacy-regulations-1523188801 [https://perma.cc/W7YXVGLV] (“U.S. technology companies have stayed largely exempt from significant government
regulation and self-policing of privacy, but that is about to change.”). Not all reputational damage
is negative for peers. For example, Tim Cook used the crisis to distinguish Apple (its purpose,
structure, and products) from Facebook and similar organizations: “The truth is we could make a
ton of money if we monetized our customer, if our customer was our product. We’ve elected not to
do that.” Ariana Brockington, Apple’s Tim Cook Slams Facebook: Privacy ‘Is a Human Right,’
‘A Civil Liberty,’ VARIETY (Mar. 28, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/tim-cookslams-facebook-privacy-1202738726 [https://perma.cc/7FG4-PFA]. By drawing attention to
organizational differences between the two companies, Cook takes aim at Zuckerberg, Facebook,
and other companies that “monetize” customers. See id.
72. Henk Pander Maat, How Promotional Language in Press Releases Is Dealt with by
Journalists: Genre Mixing or Genre Conflict?, 44 J. BUS. COMM. 59, 60 (2007).
73. See GEERT JACOBS, PREFORMULATING THE NEWS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE METAPRAGMATICS
OF PRESS RELEASES 122 (1999) (stating that press releases that meet the formal requirements of
news reporting have a greater chance of being publicized by the media); Maat, supra note 72, at
61 (“To maximize the chance of a press release being journalistically appropriated and to exert the
utmost control on how they are used, press release writers try to meet the formal requirements of
news reporting.”).
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releases avoid self-reference through the first person and adopt the
third person in order to distance themselves from the information they
provide.74 This strategy is complete if and when a journalist picks up
the press release because “news reports based on press releases avoid
mentioning their primary source.”75 Despite the appearance of
objectivity, “organizations can be seen to smuggle in positive
characterizations of their activities in seemingly innocuous thirdperson references.”76 Employing strategies such as these improves not
only the chances that a journalist will pick up the press release but also
that the journalist will edit it only minimally. As a result, the crisis
manager remains master of the narrative, supplying the information
the manager prefers.77
B. Framing Through Litigation
It is not only press releases that supply information to the public
following a crisis. Post-crisis litigation addresses the economic harms
that the parties suffered from the crisis and additionally helps address
the information vacuum surrounding it—a vacuum that can threaten
the reputation of the parties involved if it is allowed to grow. Litigation
documents supply information that can help control reputational harm.
Lawyers do not need to change their style of writing to increase traction
with journalists; instead, the way lawyers write already improves the
odds of traction. Lawyers draft litigation documents in the third person,
usually adopting the formal name of the organization concerned. This
convention aligns with the norms of formal news reporting and provides
the legal documents with a greater level of objectivity and authority.
This perception of objectivity is enhanced by legal norms that present
advocacy arguments in a clear, objective, and largely impersonal
manner that disguises self-promotion. These characteristics accord
with the “preformulation” techniques used by crisis managers when
they draft press releases to improve the chances that a journalist will

74. See JACOBS, supra note 73, at 123 (claiming that authors of press releases use thirdperson to make the press releases “look disinterested and neutral rather than self-interested,
promotional”). By using the third-person voice, “writers of press releases seem to anticipate the
typical reference forms of news reporting and . . . in doing so, they allow journalists to simply copy
the press releases.” Id. at 113. Additionally, the third-party voice disguises the source of the
information and makes the information appear more credible and objective because it seems less
self-promotional. Id. at 124 (“[W]riters of press releases indeed want to ‘hide their relationship to
the information they provide’ . . . .”).
75. Maat, supra note 72, at 61.
76. Id.
77. See JACOBS, supra note 73, at 113–14 (discussing preformulation).
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pick up the release and copy it verbatim.78 Additionally, litigation
attracts media attention because litigation documents are more
credible, provide context for events, and may provide sources that
journalists may not otherwise obtain.79
But just because litigation documents can create reputational
benefits does not mean they always will. When might we expect to
witness reputational framing in post-crisis litigation? One way to
understand these effects is with reference to proximity and
organizational similarity.
Figure 1 and the discussion that follows illustrate the effect
these factors have on expected reputational benefits. The innermost
zone presented in Figure 1 represents the focal corporation; here, the
reputational harm is most acute. The outer zones represent possible
patterns of reputational harm that can spread from the focal
corporation to its associates or peers. Reputational harm dissipates
with proximity, so lower levels of reputational harm would be expected
in Zone Three (low proximity) compared to Zone Two (high proximity).80

78. Id.
79. See infra notes 147–154 and accompanying text.
80. According to communications scholars, one of the most important factors influencing
reputational harm is proximity to the focal organization. See Yu & Lester, supra note 64, at 95
(explaining that reputational harm is also affected by high network centrality, composition of the
industry network, and reputation of the recipient organization). Proximity is based on direct
contacts between two organizations so that “[t]he closer the relational contact, the more likely that
the change in one organization’s disposition will affect the other.” Id. at 99 (“[D]irect contacts drive
organizations to closely resemble one another, which in turn evokes a similar schema for
stakeholders to interpret their true characteristics after a reputational crisis occurs. Therefore a
reputational crisis is more likely to spread to an industry participant which has direct contacts
with the focal organization.”). Stakeholders can still bundle two firms together even if those firms
do not share direct contacts but instead share “structural equivalence” or “perceived similarity in
their core attributes,” such as mission, similar organizational structure, or core technology. Id.

4. Parella (Do Not Delete)

1308

5/31/2019 2:21 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:4:1285

FIGURE 1: POST-CRISIS REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS
Zone One:
Intraorganizational
Harm
Zone Two:
Interorganizational
Harm (High
Proximity)
Zone Three:
Interorganizational
Harm (Low
Proximity)

Zone One (Intraorganizational Harm). The corporation
most at risk from a crisis is the focal corporation, or the “one in the hot
seat.” Consider, for example, Acme Corporation, a company that makes
high-tech widgets. Investigative journalism reveals that Acme Plant, a
subsidiary of Acme Corporation, polluted local waterways with extreme
levels of deadly toxins, leading to the deaths of dozens. The resulting
reputational crisis is not limited to Acme Plant but attaches to the Acme
name generally and in turn affects other units that also share the Acme
name.
If Acme Corporation brings a lawsuit against one of its
subsidiaries, it runs the risk of “reputational backfiring”: Acme
Corporation and the Acme Plant in Missouri are not organizationally
distinct enough to prevent the risk that any finger pointing at Acme
Plant through litigation may cause reputational damage to Acme
Corporation because the public cannot sufficiently distinguish between
the two. This is the risk of organizational confusion. Therefore, while
reputational risk is highest for the focal corporation, we may be less
likely to witness public relations benefits of litigation in situations of
intraorganizational reputational harm when the reputational harm of
litigation can attach to both parties.
There is one exception: if a third-party actor has already
initiated action (for example, investigation or litigation) against Acme
Plant, then Acme Corporation may be more likely to benefit from the
public relations effects of litigation because that third party has already
publicly differentiated between the two. By instigating action against
Acme Plant, the third party has opened the “black box” of Acme and
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focused attention (including negative publicity) on the Acme subsidiary.
Once this distinction has been made in the public mind, Acme
Corporation may face less of a risk of organizational confusion if it
engages in public relations litigation against Acme Plant.
Zone Two (Interorganizational Harm, High Proximity). A
business located in Zone Two is one that is in high proximity to the focal
corporation. Reputational risk to this business may not be as great as
to the focal corporation, but the business may nonetheless suffer
damaging reputational harm because of the focal corporation’s crisis.
Unlike the focal corporation, however, the proximate business may
benefit from the public relations effects of litigation that poses a lower
risk of organizational confusion because this business is
organizationally distinct from the focal one. For example, suppose that
Acme Plant makes widgets for a new line of self-driving cars
manufactured by Auto Corporation. If the public learns of the
connection, then the reputational fallout from the crisis involving Acme
Plant can spread to Auto Corporation. However, Acme and Auto are
organizationally distinct: they are separate companies, they do not
share the same name, they make different products and compete in
different markets, and they only have a buyer-supplier relationship.
These organizational differences create space between the two
corporations. While the supply relationship increases the risk of
reputational harm spreading from one corporation to the other, the
organizational differences between the two reduces the risk that
reputational damage resulting from the lawsuit that is suffered by
Acme will attach to Auto Corporation.
Zone Three (Interorganizational Harm, Low Proximity).
Corporations in Zone Three are also organizationally distinct from the
focal corporation, but with low proximity to the latter. As a result, the
risk of reputational harm from the crisis is also low, so there is less
likelihood that a corporation in this zone may benefit from reputational
effects of public relations litigation.
In summary, we are more likely to witness reputational benefits
for plaintiffs in post-crisis public relations litigation in Zone Two where
the plaintiff corporation is at high risk for reputational harm but at low
risk of organizational confusion. We may also expect similar
reputational benefits for public relations litigation in Zone One when a
third party has already initiated an investigation or litigation into one
or more actors within the focal corporation.
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C. Illustrative Examples
The previous Section provided a framework for understanding
when we might expect to witness reputational benefits of post-crisis
litigation for business litigants. This Section illustrates this framework
with two recent examples. First, we may expect reputational benefits in
litigation that occurs contemporaneously with a proxy fight.81 Here,
litigation between management and shareholders supplies information
to the media concerning each side, and this information, in turn, may
influence shareholder perceptions and votes.82 Second, we may expect
to see public relations effects in post-crisis litigation where two
associated businesses are embroiled in a public relations crisis. Here,
one side may use litigation to disseminate information to the media
(and the public) regarding what happened, why it happened, and who
was ultimately responsible. This information is significant in a crisis
situation because it affects the extent of reputational damage a
business may suffer in the wake of the crisis.
1. Zone One—Intraorganizational Reputational Harm:
Public Relations in Proxy Fights
While reputations are important during proxy fights,83 they are
not given. Instead, reputations are constructed from the information
available to a shareholder concerning each side. Consequently, each

81. See Steven Haas & Charles Brewer, Dissident’s Disclosure Lawsuit Leads to ISS
Recommendation Change, DEAL LAWYERS, Sept.-Oct. 2017, at 7, 7–8 (explaining how in a recent
proxy fight, “dissident’s offensive disclosure litigation caused ISS to reevaluate—and ultimately
withdraw—its support for the executive chairman,” thereby demonstrating “how a dissident can
use offensive litigation strategically to bolster the dissident’s arguments and influence
stockholders and proxy advisors”); T. Ray Guy, The Trial of the Hidden Agenda: Part I, A.B.A.
CORP. COUNSEL (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/trial_hidden_agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C555-PUX3] (explaining the public relations effects of a lawsuit filed by a hedge
fund in the Delaware Court of Chancery under Section 220, including (a) a lengthy demand letter
replete with “lurid allegations” against the company that was publicized and filed as an
attachment with the SEC, “where [it] could easily and immediately be accessed online and read by
other voting stockholders,” and (b) the hedge fund’s attachment of its complaint to a press release
it issued after filing the lawsuit).
82. See Guy, supra note 81 (“[A]llegations of corporate misconduct that were superfluous to
a legitimate request for information were undeniably germane to an indirect communication to
shareholders . . . .”).
83. See Proxy Contest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (10th ed. 2014) (“A struggle between
two corporate factions to obtain the votes of uncommitted shareholders.”); Proxy Fight, BARRON’S
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 585 (9th ed. 2014) (“[A] technique used by an
acquiring company to attempt to gain control of a takeover target. The acquirer tries to persuade
shareholders of the target company that the present management of the firm should be ousted in
favor of a slate of directors favorable to the acquirer.”).
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side in a proxy fight will invest significant resources in influencing the
information that shareholders receive about it and its opponent.84
But not all information wars in proxy battles occur directly. Each
side also influences its reputation (and the reputation of its opponent)
through information it disseminates to intermediaries, such as the
financial media, which in turn disseminate information to
shareholders.85 Lawsuits during a proxy fight between a company and
activist investors also provide information that the financial and news
media disseminate to the public in general and shareholders in
particular.
For example, consider the litigation between Dov Charney and
American Apparel’s board of directors following the latter’s termination
of the former. In June 2014, the board suspended Charney from his
positions as President and CEO, notifying him (and the public) that
they intended to terminate him “for cause.”86 The lawsuits that followed
the termination are important because the litigation documents
provided information to the media that it used to develop and
disseminate competing narratives explaining Charney’s termination.87
84. For example, in the largest proxy fight in U.S. history, Proctor & Gamble and activist
investor Nelson Peltz spent an estimated $100 million collectively on “mailings, phone calls
and advertisements to woo investors.” Siddharth Cavale, P&G Appoints Peltz to Board Despite
Losing Proxy Battle, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-procter-gambletrian/pg-appoints-peltz-to-board-despite-losing-proxy-battle-idUSKBN1E92ZA [https://perma.cc/
Q79D-NNE4].
85. See Matthew W. Ragas, Agenda Building During Activist Shareholder Campaigns, 39
PUB. REL. REV. 219, 219 (2013) (“Investors turn to information intermediaries such as the financial
news media to assist them in making investment decisions. Therefore, companies and their
stakeholders, particularly activist shareholders, devote significant resources to trying to shape
financial media coverage to their advantage.” (citations omitted)); Kate Sylvester, Trying to Reach
Retail Holders in a Proxy Fight? Go Digital, PROSEK (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.prosek.com/
unboxed-thoughts/trying-to-reach-retail-holders-in-a-proxy-fight-go-digital [https://perma.cc/2FBX
-8RLM]:
Just like in today’s political campaigns, voters are not just being influenced by what
they read in the papers and see on TV, but they’re also influenced by what their friends
share, tweet and like across social media channels. . . . Across the most high-profile
proxy fights this past year, we’ve seen activists and targets both upping their game with
integrated communications programs that combine traditional, digital and social tactics
to reach individual holders across the country.
86. Press Release, American Apparel, American Apparel Board Suspends Dov Charney as
CEO and Declares Intent to Terminate Him for Cause; Names John Luttrell as Interim CEO (June
18, 2014), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140618006665/en/American-ApparelBoard-Suspends-Dov-Charney-CEO [https://perma.cc/5379-L3BB].
87. See, e.g., Samantha Masunaga, In Lawsuit, Dov Charney Claims Conspiracy Between
American Apparel, Standard General, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-charney-lawsuit-20150625-story.html [https://perma.cc/6EMN-AUG5] (reporting on
a lawsuit filed by Charney against American Apparel company officials and an investor and
explaining that “[a]lthough Charney’s lawsuit echoes many of the allegations he has made in
previous legal documents, it presents new details of the ousted CEO’s version of how events
unfolded”).
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Charney had been the subject of multiple lawsuits alleging
sexual misconduct,88 and according to the board, it suspended Charney
based on its perceived risk of intraorganizational reputational harm,
whereby the public scrutiny of Charney could create reputational
damage to the broader organization. 89
The termination itself, though, created the risk of a separate
reputational crisis for Charney. This reputational risk potentially
intensified when an anonymous source leaked the termination letter to
a media source, which published the letter in full.90 This reputational
risk was significant following Charney’s termination because
shareholders would likely care about the reasons for his termination if
they were going to support his efforts to regain control of the company.91
The media, aided by information from lawsuits between Charney and
the board, helped to fill this information vacuum. Specifically, Charney
88. See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, Chief of American Apparel Faces 2nd Harassment
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/business/24bias.html
[https://perma.cc/JDB5-TX7V] (“A former American Apparel sales associate filed a lawsuit on
Wednesday alleging she was sexually harassed by Dov Charney . . . . Her claim is part of a lawsuit
filed in Los Angeles Superior Court that also named three other women . . . .”); Jonathan Stempel,
American Apparel CEO Seeks End to Sex Slave Case, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-americanapparel-sex-lawsuit/american-apparel-ceo-seeks-end
-to-sex-slave-case-idUSTRE72O5PY20110325 [https://perma.cc/KY73-9PU4] (describing the
sexual harassment lawsuit filed by Irene Morales against Charney).
89. In their notice letter to Charney, the board highlighted the financial and reputational
costs to American Apparel that they claimed resulted from Charney’s conduct. Complaint at ex. B,
Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No. BC581602 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 12, 2015), 2015 WL 2254829.
The financial costs “included expenses associated with litigation and defense costs, significant
settlement payments, [and] substantial severance packages.” Id. In terms of reputational costs,
the board claimed:
Your misconduct has also harmed the business reputation of the Company. This is
illustrated by voluminous press reports describing your behavior and the fact that the
Company has had a very difficult time raising capital and securing debt financing at
reasonable rates because of your actions. Indeed, many financing sources have refused
to become involved with American Apparel as long as you remain involved with the
Company. When the Company has been able to secure financing, it has been required
to pay a significant premium for that financing in significant part because of your
conduct.
Id.
90. Sapna Maheshwari, Exclusive: Read Ousted American Apparel CEO Dov Charney’s
Termination Letter, BUZZFEED (June 22, 2014), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sapna/
exclusive-read-ousted-american-apparel-ceo-dov-charneys-term [https://perma.cc/7THV-ZH7].
91. See Am. Apparel, LLC, Schedule 13D (June 25, 2014); Susan Berfield, American Apparel:
Charney’s Bad Behavior Was Very, Very Expensive, BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-23/american-apparel-charney-fired-for-miscon
duct-financing-problems [https://perma.cc/7ZPM-HFDW] (discussing reversal of support by
shareholder: “At this point, I don’t think that we will support Dov.”); Matt Townsend, American
Apparel Investor Expects CEO to Fight Termination, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-19/american-apparel-backer-expects-ceo-tofight-company-over-firing [https://perma.cc/7HQD-PJMX] (discussing support for Charney by
American Apparel’s second largest shareholder).
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had brought a number of lawsuits against American Apparel and
individual board members.92 Some of these lawsuits raised claims for
defamation based on the board’s communications with investors, with
one lawsuit alleging that the board’s actions “derailed Charney’s efforts
to regain control of the company”93 and “has and will continue to cause
prospective investors, business leaders and businesses to shun and
avoid doing business with Charney.”94
While Charney did not fare well in the courts,95 his defamation
lawsuits allowed him to introduce a competing narrative in the court of
public opinion.96 The lawsuits provided even more material with which
the media could tell the story of the termination, including links to court
documents, which has reputational consequences for Charney or the
board during the fight for control of the company.97
2. Zone Two—Interorganizational Reputational Harm:
Crisis Communications and Post-Crisis Litigation
While a crisis can hurt a corporation’s reputation, not all crises
are equal. Some crises levy greater levels of reputational harm
depending on the blameworthiness of the corporation in the opinions of
stakeholders.98 Crisis management scholarship identifies three types of

92. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 89; Complaint, Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No.
BC585664 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 19, 2015).
93. Complaint, supra note 92, at 7.
94. Id.
95. See Peg Brickley, Dov Charney Faces Setback in Defamation Suits Against American
Apparel, WALL ST. J.: BANKR. BEAT (Oct. 8, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2015/10/
08/dov-charney-faces-setback-in-defamation-suits-against-american-apparel [https://perma.cc/PC
2B-PBFW].
96. Charney’s termination letter and his lawyer’s letter in response were made available in
full by media sources. This publicity was important because each of these letters offered competing
narratives explaining Charney’s termination. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
97. In 2015, American Apparel filed for bankruptcy; Charney subsequently started a new
clothing company, Los Angeles Apparel. Jessica DiNapoli, American Apparel Files for Second
Bankruptcy in Just over a Year, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bank
ruptcy-americanapparel-idUSKBN1390GX [https://perma.cc/S69Y-83XK]; Matthew Townsend,
Dov Charney Couldn’t Keep American Apparel, So He Restarted It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(July 12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-07-12/dov-charney-couldn-t-keepamerican-apparel-so-he-restarted-it [https://perma.cc/YKD8-AZMR].
98. See W. Timothy Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The
Development and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory, 10 CORP. REPUTATION
REV. 163, 166–68 (2007) (listing the other two factors as crisis history and prior relational
reputation); W. Timothy Coombs, An Analytic Framework for Crisis Situations: Better Responses
from a Better Understanding of the Situation, 10 J. PUB. REL. RES. 177, 181–82 (1998) (“Two
dimensions seem to explain basic crisis attributions: external control and personal control/locus of
causality. External control is the degree to which external agents could control the crisis event.
Personal control/locus of causality is the degree to which the organization itself could control the
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crises, with corresponding levels of blame attribution and reputational
harm: victim, accidental, and preventable.99 In the first type of crisis,
the organization is perceived as a victim of the crisis; this crisis type is
associated with the lowest attribution of responsibility and the mildest
reputational threat.100 The reputational threat increases with each of
the other two types of crises, culminating with the preventable crisis,
in which stakeholders believe that the “organization knowingly placed
people at risk, took inappropriate actions[,] or violated a
law/regulation.”101 This type of crisis is associated with strong
attributions of responsibility and severe reputational threat.102 All
things being equal, a corporation can minimize the reputational harm
sustained from a crisis if stakeholders perceive it as a victim crisis and
not as a preventable one.103
The type of crisis is not a given; it is constructed. Crisis
managers use information to control reputational damage. Specifically,
they employ “frames” to make the underlying crisis appear more like
one type (such as a victim crisis) and less like another type (such as a
preventable crisis).104 Framing is part of a crisis response strategy and
the frame promoted depends on which crisis response strategy the
organization adopts.105 Organizations may try to deny their
involvement through scapegoating (“blam[ing] some person or group
outside of the organization for the crisis”) or diminishing their
responsibility through excuse (“denying intent to do harm and/or
claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis”).106
Finally, crisis managers may also use “bolstering” strategies such as
reminder and ingratiation (“[t]ell[ing] stakeholders about the past good
works of the organization”) and victimage (“remind[ing] stakeholders
that the organization is a victim of the crisis too”) in order to minimize
reputational damage.107
crisis event.”); id. at 187 (finding that “[c]risis types near to the high endpoint of greater personal
control elicit stronger perceptions of crisis responsibility than those crisis types near the low end”).
99. Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations, supra note 98, at 168.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 167:
A crisis manager tries to establish or shape the crisis frame by emphasizing certain
cues. The cues include whether or not some external agent or force caused the crisis,
whether the crisis was a result of accidental or intentional actions by members of the
organization and whether the cause of the crisis was technical or human error.
105. Id. at 171.
106. Id. at 170.
107. Id.; see William L. Benoit, Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication, 23 PUB.
REL. REV. 177, 180 (1997) (“[A] corporation may use bolstering to strengthen the audience’s
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These types of framing techniques can also arise in post-crisis
litigation. For example, litigation documents filed by Walgreens against
Theranos in the wake of the latter’s blood-testing scandal not only
addressed the economic harms that Walgreens suffered but also the
reputational costs associated with the crisis.
Theranos and its CEO, Elizabeth Holmes, captured the national
stage with claims that they could revolutionize the multibillion-dollar
blood-testing industry by providing inexpensive, direct-to-consumer
(“DTC”) blood-testing kits that could provide results with a “few drops
of blood.”108 The Wall Street Journal later revealed that “[a]t the end of
2014, the lab instrument developed as the linchpin of its strategy
handled just a small fraction of the tests then sold to consumers.”109 It
also referenced concerns from physicians and former employees
regarding the technology’s accuracy and Theranos’s compliance with
federal regulations.110 The situation grew from bad to worse for
Theranos as it faced investigations, lawsuits, and regulatory
sanctions.111
Theranos offered tests to the public through “Wellness Centers”
that were located in Walgreens drugstores.112 While Theranos’s
reputation was impacted due to its technology, Walgreens was criticized
for a different reason. The scandal raised doubts about whether

positive feelings toward the [sic] itself, in order to offset the negative feelings connected with the
wrongful act.”).
108. Roger Parloff, Theranos Jump-Starts Consumer Lab Testing, FORTUNE (May 7, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/05/07/theranos-jump-starts-consumer-lab-testing [https://perma.cc/P3D4EPKQ].
109. John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Test Technology,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-tests1444881901 [https://perma.cc/7PX2-K9EF].
110. Id.
111. See Kia Kokalitcheva, Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes Banned from Operating a Lab,
FORTUNE (July 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/08/theranos-holmes-banned/ [https://perma.cc/
74TZ-CQ8K] (detailing regulatory sanctions imposed on Theranos and its CEO by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services); Christopher Weaver, John Carreyrou & Michael Siconolfi,
Theranos Is Subject of Criminal Probe by U.S., WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/theranos-is-subject-of-criminal-probe-by-u-s-1461019055 [https://perma.cc/AZ7Z-UYQD]
(describing probes by federal criminal prosecutors, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the U.S. Postal Inspection Service).
112. Carreyrou, supra note 109; Theranos Selects Walgreens as a Long-Term Partner Through
Which To Offer Its New Clinical Laboratory Service, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 9, 2013),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130909005578/en/Theranos-Selects-Walgreens-Long
-Term-Partner-Offer-New [https://perma.cc/2J74-FERD] (“Theranos, Inc. and Walgreens . . . today
announced a long-term partnership to bring access to Theranos’ new lab testing service through
Walgreens pharmacies nationwide.”).
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Walgreens—a trusted household name, increasingly associated with
consumer health—had acted as a proper steward of consumer trust.113
These doubts were reinforced by the wave of lawsuits that piled
up against Theranos and Walgreens in the wake of media reports and
regulatory sanctions. For example, in R.C. v. Theranos, the plaintiff
blamed Walgreens for Theranos’s ability to perpetuate its fraud because
the plaintiff alleged that Walgreens’s national footprint and reputation
“bolstered the validity of Theranos,”114 and “[d]espite all the red flags,
Walgreens moved forward with its partnership with Theranos, provided
Theranos with $50 million in financing and open[ed] numerous
Theranos Wellness Centers inside of Walgreens stores.”115 A separate
lawsuit filed shortly thereafter, L.T. v. Theranos, alleged that
Walgreens prioritized profits over patient safety when it failed to
perform adequate due diligence on Theranos’s technology.116
In 2016, Walgreens brought its own lawsuit against Theranos.
More than just seeking damages from Theranos, the lawsuit offered a
means for Walgreens to address the reputation-damaging allegations
raised in the lawsuits against it. The complaint asserted that
Walgreens performed adequate due diligence before entering into a
contract that exposed its consumers to Theranos’s new technology.117 It

113. In May 2016, Fortune published a story that accused Walgreens of failing to verify the
technology before entering into the contract and exposing its customers to unverified technology.
Sy Mukherjee, Walgreens Reportedly Struck Theranos Deal Without Verifying the Tech, FORTUNE
(May 26, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/26/walgreens-didnt-verify-theranos/ [https://perma.cc/
UE6C-3CZF].
114. Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial Demanded at 13, R.C. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 2:16cv-02373 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2016), 2016 WL 3900728; see also id. at 75 (“[Plaintiff] knew of
Walgreens’ reputation as a longstanding provider of safe and reliable pharmacy care and knew
that Theranos’ blood testing facility was located within a local Walgreen’s store. He trusted
Theranos and Walgreens to provide reliable test results.”). It also drew attention to affirmative
steps Walgreens took to endorse and market Theranos’s technology, such as issuing a joint press
release in 2013. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 15.
116. See Class Action Complaint at 9–10, L.T. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02660 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 5, 2016) (“According to public reports, however, Safeway pulled out of its deal with Theranos
after its due diligence raised questions about the accuracy of the testing Theranos sought to offer.”)
The complaint alleged that “Walgreens, exposed to nearly identical warning signs, instead
invested $50 million into Theranos and joined Theranos in its plan to seize an outsized portion of
the lucrative nationwide lab testing industry and capture a nationwide market of patients.” Cf.
Class Action Complaint at 5, B.P. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02775 (D. Ariz. Aug. 17, 2016)
(“According to published reports, throughout the process, Walgreens executives did not press for
further verification because they were afraid Theranos would respond to questions by choosing
another retail chain to work with as a partner.”).
117. Complaint at 7, Walgreen Co. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01040 (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2017)
[hereinafter Walgreens Complaint] (describing review performed by individuals at Johns Hopkins
University).
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also repeatedly referenced assurances made to Walgreens by
representatives of Theranos.118
The crisis management strategies of denial and diminishing
responsibility appear in Walgreens’s litigation narratives when it
explains how little it knew of Theranos’s practices. In its complaint,
Walgreens alleged that Theranos went to great lengths to keep
information about its technology’s inadequacies from Walgreens.119
Specifically, Walgreens alleged that Theranos repeatedly refused
Walgreens’s request for a report from a regulatory body.120 Walgreens
also claimed that it was as much in the dark as the public and learned
about Theranos’s misdeeds the same way the public did: press
reports.121 According to Walgreens, media coverage, especially by the
Wall Street Journal, filled the information gap that had grown between
the parties because of Theranos’s unwillingness to answer Walgreens’s
questions.122 These statements emphasize the crisis management
strategy of excuse, where organizational actors attempt to minimize
their responsibility for a crisis by asserting “lack of information about
or control over important elements of the situation.”123
The complaint also illustrates secondary strategies of bolstering.
It incorporates reminder and ingratiation techniques by
communicating Walgreens’s vigilance in seeking the truth despite
Walgreens’s claims that Theranos did not share information.124 While
drawing attention to Theranos’s conduct, the complaint emphasized
that Walgreens never abandoned its role as a steward of its consumers’
trust.125 The complaint also addressed the profit motive allegation
(raised in litigation against Walgreens and Theranos) by clarifying that
118. See, e.g., id. at 5, 6, 9, 16 (providing Walgreens’s description of assurances by Theranos
executives and attorney); Plaintiff Walgreen Co.’s Response in Opposition to Defendant Theranos,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, Walgreen Co. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01040 (D. Del. Feb. 6,
2017) [hereinafter Walgreens Opposition Brief] (“Of paramount importance, Theranos assured
Walgreens that its innovative blood-testing technology would be safe and its operations would be
of high quality.”).
119. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 15.
120. See id. at 18, 20–21.
121. Id. at 25 (“Theranos hid the CMS letter from Walgreens for almost a month. In fact, it is
likely that Theranos would have hidden the CMS letter for longer. Walgreens learned of the letter
for the first time on April 13, 2016, when it was reported by the press.”); Walgreens Opposition
Brief, supra note 118, at 6.
122. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 18.
123. Benoit, supra note 107, at 180.
124. See Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 14 (“Walgreens promptly sought answers
from Theranos.”); id. 28–29 (describing Walgreens’s reasons for terminating its agreement with
Theranos).
125. See id. at 18–19, 27–29; see also Walgreens Opposition Brief, supra note 118, at 4 (“The
Agreement included important provisions to safeguard the health of Walgreens’ customers and
protect Walgreens’ reputation as a trusted provider in the communities it serves.”).
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Walgreens’s “core mission is to help people in those communities” that
it serves to “lead healthier and happier lives.”126
The parties finally settled their lawsuit for an undisclosed
amount in August 2017, resulting in the dismissal of Walgreens’s
lawsuit against Theranos “with no finding or implication of liability.”127
III. EXPLAINING PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFECTS: THE COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGES OF COURTS AS INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
MECHANISMS
The previous Part explained why an organization in need of
reputational repair may gain public relations benefits from post-crisis
litigation. But identifying these benefits does not explain why courts of
law influence public opinion to begin with. This may not be surprising
if the information courts reveal is new, extracted from the parties
through rules allowing for discovery. But when the information from
litigation has already been revealed by other sources, why is it salient?
The following Part offers three distinct but overlapping reasons why
litigation may be superior to other types of information transmission
mechanisms in society: relationship with media, market for
information, and aggregation.
A. Relationship with Media
A reputation-building activity is only beneficial for the
reputation-building firm if knowledge of that activity influences the
conduct of the business’s target audience. But the activity can only exert
such an influence if the target audience learns of it. In other words,
there must be some mechanism by which information regarding one
party (such as a rival) is communicated to another party (such as a
potential entrant).
One of the most important information intermediaries is the
media. The media fulfills a variety of functions that impact the
reputation of a business. First, the media addresses information
asymmetries between firms and the public by consolidating evaluations
of the business made by information intermediaries, such as the

126. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 1; Lydia Ramsey, Theranos Just Settled Its
Lawsuit with Walgreens, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.timesunion.com/technology/
businessinsider/article/Theranos-just-settled-its-lawsuit-with-Walgreens-11723781.php
[https://perma.cc/3PXB-PM2A].
127. Press Release, Theranos, Theranos Reaches Settlement with Walgreens (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170801006383/en [https://perma.cc/2NDA-XJWG].
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government or ratings agencies.128 Through this process, the media
influences what issues are discussed and how they are discussed.
Second, the media can actively contribute to the reputation of a firm
through forum hosting. The media serves as a forum through which
different stakeholders exchange and even debate conflicting views of a
business.129 The media expressly cultivates this function by soliciting
opinions of business behavior from diverse constituencies.130 In this
way, “the media provide[s] a forum where firms and stakeholders
debate what constitutes a good firm and which firms have good
reputations.”131 Accordingly, the media helps to shape a business’s
reputation, influencing how it is perceived by its stakeholders.
The media also helps to shape the public agenda on issues
concerning a business or even an entire industry; this is known as the
“agenda-setting” function of the media. According to analysts of this
function, “the day-to-day selection and display of news by journalists
focuses the public’s attention and influences its perceptions.”132 The
media’s coverage of a business and its activities contributes to the
public agenda because the “prominence of elements in the news
influences the prominence of those elements among the public.”133
The process of agenda setting begins with the attention that a
media organization accords a particular business and its activities or
products.134 Through cues, such as the length of a story or its frequency,
the public will decide which business’s behavior most warrants their
attention.135 But the media does not stop there. It also provides a filter
through which the public associates the business with a set of
attributes:
By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, the news media influence the
criteria by which presidents, government policies, political candidates, and corporations
are judged. Most recently, major media attention to issues of financial reporting and

128. Deephouse, supra note 27, at 1098.
129. Id. at 1097–98.
130. Id. at 1097 (“They will ask a firm to respond to a stakeholder evaluation or ask a
stakeholder to respond to a firm action or statement. One evaluation may lead to a competing or
even a supporting evaluation by another source.”).
131. Id.
132. Craig E. Carroll & Maxwell McCombs, Agenda-Setting Effects of Business News on the
Public’s Images and Opinions about Major Corporations, 6 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 36, 36 (2003).
133. Id. at 36–37; see Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects in
the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631, 632 (2003) (“Therefore, in
performing its functions of informing, highlighting, and framing, the media presents market
participants with information that affects impression formation and the legitimation of firms.”).
134. Carroll & McCombs, supra note 132, at 37.
135. Id.
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corporate governance suggest significant criteria for the evaluation of all companies and
their executives, not just the companies explicitly mentioned in these news reports.136

Thus, negative media coverage of a particular issue shines a
light on a broad swath of firms, not just the particular firm that is under
scrutiny.137 Given the stakes of agenda setting, businesses may choose
not to act passively concerning how the media portrays them and may
instead offer “information subsidies” to media sources. These subsidies
consist of “source-provided news releases, advertisements, speeches,
and related materials, which attempt ‘to intentionally shape the news
agenda by reducing journalists’ costs of gathering information.’ ”138
Through information subsidies, businesses attempt to influence
“construction of the media agenda.”139
One area where businesses employ information subsidies is in
proxy fights. A number of investors obtain their information from
financial media. The information that financial media communicates is
therefore important to how these investors view the parties to a proxy
fight and, in turn, may influence how the investors vote on an issue. In
the proxy context, information subsidies include shareholder letters,
news releases, presentation slides, memos, and even advertisements.140
Critically, “these subsidies are made accessible to the media through
the candidate’s campaign websites, paid newswire services, and
required filings with the U.S. S.E.C.’s Electronic Data-Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. Filings are monitored by
financial journalists and investors, and serve as a principal source of
information.”141
One case study of agenda building in the 2008 proxy contest
between Carl Icahn and Yahoo examined party-controlled information
subsidies and financial media coverage of the contest.142 The case study
concluded that “[t]he issue agendas articulated in the information
subsidies disseminated by both candidates were generally linked with
financial media coverage of the contest. These linkages were found with
both business newswires and newspapers . . . .”143 The research found
136. Id. at 41.
137. Vinit M. Desai, The Impact of Media Information on Issue Salience Following Other
Organizations’ Failures, 40 J. MGMT. 893, 899 (2014); see also id. at 913 (noting the relationship
between “issue salience within organizations” and “media communication . . . following other
organizations’ failures”).
138. Matthew W. Ragas et al., Agenda-Building in the Corporate Sphere: Analyzing Influence
in the 2008 Yahoo!–Icahn Proxy Contest, 37 PUB. REL. REV. 257, 258 (2011) (citation omitted).
139. Ragas, supra note 85, at 219.
140. Ragas, supra note 138, at 259.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 261.
143. Id.
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that information subsidies did not generally increase the level of
attention that the media devoted to a proxy contest; that seemed to
relate more to the size of the firm at the center of the fight.144 However,
information subsidies, controlled by the parties, seemed far more likely
to relate to the media’s coverage of specific issues in the proxy contest.145
In fact, according to the research, the media-party link goes in both
directions so that “campaigns generally responded to – rather than
influenced – the importance accorded specific stakeholders by
journalists in coverage.”146
Litigation can similarly offer important information subsidies to
the media. First, litigation may provide journalists with access to
sources that they could not otherwise have obtained.147 For example, in
one of their motions, a board member of American Apparel provided a
“sampling of ‘illicit email and text messages’ Charney allegedly sent to
employees while still with American Apparel.”148 Media sources
subsequently excerpted from this “sampling” in their stories about the
battles between Charney and American Apparel.149 Litigation sources
help journalists provide facts that the public may not get otherwise and
by using “components” that help to tell that story, such as “good quotes,
identifiable victims . . . , detail, and color.”150 Second, these sources are
special not only because they may reveal unknown facts but because
they may protect journalists from libel as well.151 Further, legal sources
are more credible than many alternatives because “[i]nformation
produced during litigation or investigation is given under oath, with the
threat of legal sanction for perjury assuring more credibility than the
journalist can find when tapping non‐legal sources.”152
Even when litigation does not produce new information,
journalists value legal sources because these sources can corroborate
previous knowledge, which can help a journalist convince an editor to
144. Matthew W. Ragas, Agenda-Building and Agenda-Setting in Corporate Proxy Contests:
Exploring Influence Among Public Relations Efforts, Financial Media Coverage and
Investor Opinion 241 (2010), http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/UF/E0/04/15/54/00001/ragas_m.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AXK4-MFMD] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida).
145. Id. at 241–42.
146. Id. at 242.
147. Roy Shapira, Law as Source: How the Legal System Facilitates Investigative Journalism,
37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 174 (2018).
148. See Hilary Hanson, Read the Sexts Ex-American Apparel CEO Dov Charney Allegedly
Sent Employees, HUFFINGTONPOST (June 24, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/
24/dov-charney-american-apparel-sexts_n_7655522.html [https://perma.cc/2MSM-R6Q6].
149. Id.
150. Shapira, supra note 147, at 180 (footnotes omitted); see also Frankel, supra note 147, at
365.
151. Shapira, supra note 147, at 174.
152. Id. at 174–75.
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invest time in investigating the story.153 Additionally, legal sources can
help contextualize and “process[ ] existing information” because
“[j]udicial opinions or regulatory investigative reports, for example, are
good at fleshing out patterns of misbehavior, organizing large chunks
of information, and making it all less complex for the journalist.”154
B. The Age of “Fake News”: Information Asymmetries in the
Market for Information
The information transmission capabilities of courts of law and
the media cannot be examined in isolation. Instead, they are
components of the broader information environment in which we are
situated. The fate of one influences our choice to turn to the latter. In
this environment, media stories supported by legal documents may
have particular salience in the age of “fake news.”
The term “fake news” is ubiquitous. It refers to “fabricated
information that mimics news media content in form but not in
organizational process or intent.”155 Consider the problem of “fake
news” as another version of George Akerlof's lemons problem: We are
consumers of information and, as consumers, we make choices as to who
we go to for information. But consumers are faced with a plethora of
options. If they are aware that there is some level of “fake news”
circulating in the media, how do they sort through their options and
differentiate “fake news” from “real news”? This task is made more
difficult by technology, which has enabled many producers of
information to adopt the semblance of legitimacy through professional
designs and appearances, and sophisticated dissemination
techniques.156 As a consequence, merchants of low-quality products
(“fake news”) may appear very similar to merchants of high-quality
products (“real news”) because the former are able to imitate the latter
(in form, not content) and the latter are unable to signal their quality
153. Id. at 179.
154. Id. at 176.
155. David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a
Multidisciplinary Effort, SCIENCE 1094 (Mar. 9, 2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/
sci/359/6380/1094.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W6K-N4E7]; see also Mark Verstraete, Derek E.
Bambauer & Jane R. Bambauer, Identifying and Countering Fake News 8 (Ariz. Legal Studies,
Discussion Paper No. 17-15, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007971
[https://perma.cc/GDR4-GZHA] (distinguishing among five different types of “fake news”: hoax,
satire, propaganda, trolling, and humor).
156. See Lazer et al., supra note 155, at 1094 (explaining how “the internet has lowered the
cost of entry to new competitors”); Verstraete, supra note 155, at 10 (describing a “website that
publishes news stories that are untrue and uses a mark that closely resembles that of CNN” and
explaining that the “close similarity” between the two “often fools people into viewing the site as
disseminating true information”).
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to consumers of information.157 One study of “fake news” raises concerns
about the ability or willingness of readers to engage in the requisite
sorting exercise, arguing that “[r]eaders operate in digital media
ecosystems that incentivize low-level engagement with news stories”158
and “[c]onsumers of fake news have limited incentives to invest in
challenging or verifying its content, particularly when the material
reinforces their existing beliefs and perspectives.”159
In this environment, media stories supported by litigation
documents may be particularly salient because litigation has two
features that address the information problem. First, there is a barrier
to entry that usually requires access to legal expertise before a producer
of information (a litigant) can introduce information for consumption in
the litigation process. It is not a perfect system. It is both
underinclusive, denying access to justice for parties with potentially
meritorious claims who do not have access to resources, and
overinclusive, providing access to justice for those who can access the
resources even if they lack a meritorious claim. Second, litigation has a
process for sorting out truth. When parties present conflicting
narratives, the courts have mechanisms for parsing the truth from
these narratives. As such, the media, on the one hand, and the litigants
and courts of law, on the other, benefit from this symbiotic relationship:
the media helps to share information from litigation (as discussed in
Section III.A) and litigation documents help distinguish media stories
in the market for information.
C. Aggregation: Broadening the Audience for Knowledge
Legal documents serve important information functions aside
from persuading readers of the merits of the parties’ positions. Instead,

157. See Verstraete, supra note 155, at 11:
Disclaimers about a site publishing false news stories are often buried in fine print at
the bottom of the page, and some fake news stories reveal themselves to be fake in the
article itself, which can be a problem in a media culture where many people do not read
past the headlines.;
see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 674, 676–77 (1984) (discussing the problem of imitation by sellers of
low-quality products and the need for additional signaling strategies by sellers of high-quality
products).
158. Verstraete, supra note 155, at 11; see also id. at 12–13 (discussing the problem of
distinguishing fake news when “true and false information coexist in fake news narratives and on
news platforms” with the result that “narratives . . . have staying power because some of the
narrative elements are true, yet the story is presented in a way that is misleading and not true”).
159. Id. at 32; see also Lazer et al., supra note 155, at 1095 (“Individuals tend not to question
the credibility of information unless it violates their preconceptions or they are incentivized to do
so.”).
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legal documents are good aggregators of information available from
other sources in society.160 Lawyers support their factual and legal
statements by citing sources that support those statements.161 The
effect of this practice is that legal pleadings can point readers to sources
of information other than the primary legal document (that is, to “thirdparty sources”): relevant judicial opinions, regulations, government
reports, nongovernmental organization investigations, scientific
reports, statistical analyses, legal commentaries, economic studies,
academic commentaries, press statements, investor reports, and media
stories, among others.162
Citation practice has two important information consequences.
First, litigation documents improve the credibility of the litigant’s own
statements by drawing on other sources; a skeptical reader may become
more persuaded by the arguments after taking note of the supporting
materials. Second, pleadings serve as advertisements for these other
sources by expanding the audience for discrete sources of knowledge.
The medical science community may heed developments shared in
Nature and The New England Journal of Medicine, but noncommunity
members generally may not. A pleading broadens the audience for this
information by channeling it toward a different audience. Critically, a
pleading also markets this information to new audiences by implicitly
demonstrating the relevance of this information to individuals not
primarily concerned with scientific discoveries.
For example, in the Walgreens complaint, Walgreens points the
reader to articles published in the Wall Street Journal, Washington
Post, and the New York Times,163 public statements made by Theranos
representatives,164 audit results performed by state regulatory
agencies,165 certification reports from federal agencies,166 a study from

160. See, e.g., Parella, supra note 13, at 965–67.
161. See John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1011
(2014) (explaining how advances in legal search technologies led to substantial increases in the
number of citations per judicial opinion); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism
as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1103 (1997) (“[L]egal decisionmaking differs from
other forms of decisionmaking in that legal decisionmakers are often expected not only to justify
their decisions with formal written opinions, but also to include within those opinions reference to
the authorities on which the decisionmakers have relied.”).
162. See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 161, at 1012 (noting that legal search technology
increased the availability of secondary and nonlegal sources, which resulted in “U.S. Supreme
Court cases from 1950 to 1995 show[ing] a large spike of nonlegal sources starting in 1991”);
Schauer & Wise, supra note 161, at 1105 (hypothesizing a change in the information sets relied on
by lawyers and judges to now include greater diversity of sources).
163. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 13, 18, 23, 25, 26–27.
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id. at 15.
166. Id. at 16–17.
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the peer-reviewed Journal of Clinical Investigation,167 scientific
information from the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine,168 and
statements from medical academics,169 among others. Thus, the
Walgreens complaint aggregated information from a variety of sources,
strengthening its claims and pointing the public audience to third-party
sources it may not otherwise consult.
IV. IMPLICATIONS: DISTRIBUTED GAINS
The foregoing discussion provide illustrative examples of how
litigation allows parties to build their reputations through signaling,
framing, or both. These examples reveal how reputational benefits can
supply the missing value in a lawsuit that otherwise appears
unsuccessful. But not all reputational benefits are the same. This Part
revisits many of the examples discussed previously to introduce three
distinct types of reputational benefits: gains distributed across time
(intertemporal), across parties (interparty), and even across
institutions (interinstitutional). While these gains are produced from
the model of reputation building explained by Milgrom and Roberts, it
is important to recognize that these distributed gains can accompany
reputation building through litigation as well. Section IV.A expands on
these different types of reputational gains and explains how both
signaling and framing techniques can lead to these gains in litigation.
Section IV.B explains the significance of this descriptive insight for
understanding litigant incentives. Finally, Section IV.C discusses
procedural tools that exist currently or may be adopted in order to
discourage distributed gains from reputation-building litigation; this is
especially significant when those gains come at the cost of a third-party
actor, including one who may not be in court.
A. Reputation Building and Distributed Gains
Milgrom and Roberts’s analysis shows us that gains are
interparty, intertemporal, and interinstitutional.170 First, costs
incurred against one party may translate into gains against another.
Second, gains can also be intertemporal in that losses in one moment in
time against one party may translate into gains against another party,
contemporaneously or in the future, through the reputation gained by

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 32.
See Milgrom & Robert, supra note 14, at 302.
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the litigant. Finally, gains can be interinstitutional when they are
created in one institution but enjoyed in another. For example, a party
may build its reputation through litigation but enjoy those benefits in
the marketplace rather than the courtroom.
Whether by signaling or framing, reputation building through
litigation can help supply the three types of distributed gains discussed
above. Litigants may benefit from these gains even if they lose in the
short term. For example, reputation building through signaling in
litigation can help produce these three different types of distributed
gains. Intellectual property litigation serves reputation-building
functions because it signals to employees who might leave that exit is
costly. Potentially departing employees confront information
asymmetries regarding the capacity and willingness of their employers
to file a lawsuit upon the employee’s departure. An employee must base
exit decisions on the employer’s history of filing lawsuits, a practice that
provides that employer with a reputation for litigiousness. Even if the
employer plaintiff loses a case against one employee, its reputation for
litigiousness may discourage other employees from leaving in the
future. Therefore, the reputation gained in the initial lawsuit (or
subsequent ones) provides the employer with retention benefits in the
future (intertemporal) against a different set of employees (interparty).
These effects are also interinstitutional because the reputationalbuilding exercise occurs in one institution (the courts) while the fruits
of those efforts are enjoyed in another (employment relationship).
Similarly, reputation building through litigation is important to
PAEs because it increases the revenue that they can earn on their
patents, even otherwise “bad patents.”171 Therefore, patent
infringement lawsuits brought by PAEs also offer the types of
distributed gains discussed above. While a PAE may lose its patent
infringement lawsuit, it gains a reputation for litigiousness that makes
its threat to sue future companies credible, thereby making it more
likely that those companies will agree to licensing terms that are
beneficial to the PAE; these are both intertemporal and interparty
gains. Additionally, these gains are interinstitutional because the
reputation is built within the institution of the legal system but enjoyed
as market gains through private contracting.
Distributed gains from reputation building through framing can
also be witnessed in litigation. In a proxy fight or other corporate battle,
litigation narratives can help frame events in a way that is more
beneficial for one side than the other; this framing is important when

171. Id.
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each side is vying for support from a specific party, such as from
investors. Similarly, following the crisis, framing techniques can help
litigants manage how third-party stakeholders perceive the crisis and
their role in it.
B. Distributed Gains and Litigant Incentives
The most familiar rationale for litigation is dispute resolution:
parties file lawsuits to receive redress from the courts for harms
suffered. But distributed gains offer another explanation for why
parties may litigate even when they do not expect to gain from either
winning or settling the dispute. As this Article has illustrated, parties
obtain benefits from litigation that do not come from the courtroom. A
lawsuit can help cement a party’s reputation as litigious—a reputation
that helps that party later reach desired results in its interaction with
third parties not involved in the lawsuit. Some of these third parties
may fear becoming future targets of similar lawsuits and may therefore
be more willing to acquiesce to the litigious party’s demands. Or the
lawsuit may help a party frame a crisis in a particular way and attract
media attention so that the party can disseminate that narrative. For
example, litigation documents may adopt crisis management strategies
that can frame a crisis in a way that minimizes the reputational risk to
the business litigant who is implicated in the crisis.
But not all distributed gains are about helping the litigant.
There is a species of lawsuits known as “malicious lawsuits” where the
plaintiff “obtains some utility whenever the defendant is forced to
undergo a monetary or non-monetary – e.g. reputational – loss.”172
Here, the plaintiff “may benefit from filing even if reaching a settlement
is not an option; he obtains utility from malice if he files and withdraws
after having forced the defendant to incur expenses on defense.”173 In
this situation, the plaintiff “gains” when he or she can impose some
reputational loss on the defendant; the latter’s pain is the former’s gain
even if the former does not obtain anything else. From torts174 to

172. Brishti Guha, Malicious Litigation, 47 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 24, 24 (2016).
173. Id. at 25. Guha recommends adding a “commitment requirement” to an optional
settlement bar that “commit[s] the plaintiff to go to trial if the defendant refuses to cede or settle
and puts up a defense.” Id. at 30.
174. See Hershovitz, supra note 25, at 86–102.
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property,175 plaintiffs litigate out of revenge and spite toward neighbors,
family, and rivals, among others.176
Society may dislike these types of lawsuits for many reasons,
including because the plaintiff uses the courtroom to injure the
reputation of the defendant. But the use of the courtroom to impose
reputational costs is not limited to malicious lawsuits; instead, this
practice is implicit whenever we witness distributed gains. When a
party uses litigation to build its reputation, that reputation usually
comes at the cost of another.177 In framing techniques, a litigant
redeems its reputation during a crisis usually by blaming another
party. In signaling techniques, a litigant builds its reputation by
exercising its litigation prowess against one party in order to influence
how third parties view it. In these examples, the objects of the
reputation-building activities often incur some kind of reputational
cost, even if those costs fall short of the malicious action described
above.
C. Constraining Distributed Gains: Dismissal, Settlement Bars, and
the Litigation Privilege
The previous Sections explained how distributed gains operate.
We may want to limit these gains either because we do not want
litigants to profit in this manner or because we do not want them to
impose reputational costs on others. While publicity around litigation
has always had the capacity to wound a party’s reputation, social media
and online access to information potentially deepens those wounds.
This Section discusses different tools that may limit these unwanted
reputational effects.
1. Dismissals and the Timing of the Reputational Effect
We may wonder why the timing of reputational effects matters
so long as baseless claims are exposed and dismissed. The problem is
the difference in timing between when the reputational effect of the
lawsuit is achieved and when dismissal occurs. While courts may be
very good at screening out baseless claims, this screening often occurs
too late in the process, either when plaintiffs have already gained
reputational advantages upon filing a lawsuit or shortly thereafter. For
175. See Katz, supra note 25, at 1456–58 (analyzing various cases in which people sued their
neighbors to be “petty or spiteful” or to “punish the defendant”).
176. See Guha, supra note 172, at 26 (explaining that plaintiffs in malicious litigation cases
bring lawsuits for the benefits they receive from imposing costs on their “rival[s]”).
177. Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–4).
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example, the Massachusetts Superior Court granted ShaveLogic’s
motion for summary judgment on Gillette’s claims,178 but according to
ShaveLogic, Gillette had already attained its desired effect upon filing:
the lawsuit drove away potential business partners that ShaveLogic
would need to compete in the market.179
The timing issue challenges a fundamental assumption we have
concerning the salience of different types of information from courts.
We may view litigation information as significant in at least two
different ways. First, information is significant when a court has made
some kind of ruling in the dispute, especially concerning the liability of
the parties involved. In this case, courts provide normative guidance on
society’s rules and determine whether the parties have violated those
rules. Second, courts are also unique sites for information revelation
through the various tools available in discovery. These tools allow
parties to learn information possessed by another. This information
may also make its way to the public through court filings and media
coverage of those filings. But as the ShaveLogic example illustrates,
business litigants may achieve their reputational objectives before they
even file suit.180 If so, the tools for identifying baseless claims become
available too late in the process to prevent some parties from obtaining
reputational rewards from their actions and their opponents from
suffering the consequences. This indicates that the threat of dismissal
may not serve as a sufficient deterrent against reputation-building
litigation by strategic parties.181
2. Motivations of Litigants and Settlement Bars
Whether through framing or signaling, information from
litigation can influence public opinion. Even early-stage litigation that
may have a low signaling effect can influence public opinion by
attracting media attention and communicating to the public frames and
narratives that shape the reputation of the parties.182
178. Gillette Co. v. Provost, No. 136751, 2017 BL 173926, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 19,
2017).
179. Gillette Co. v. Provost, No. 15-0149 B, 2015 WL 9911345, at *3–4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan.
16, 2015), 2015 WL 216997.
180. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
181. See also Nina Golden, SLAPP Down: The Use (and Abuse) of Anti-SLAPP Motions to
Strike, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 426, 431 (2015) (discussing the reputational risk and
litigation costs associated with SLAPP suits that are meritless).
182. See Lidsky, supra note 7, at 881 (explaining that in the defamation context, “[e]ven if the
company ultimately decides not to pursue its action past filing a complaint, it may have won a
symbolic victory simply by suing John Doe”); see also Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role
in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559, 573–75 (2015) (explaining the publicity effects of
litigation).
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The effect of public opinion is important to consider when
creating solutions to deter socially undesirable lawsuits. To see why,
consider nuisance suits. One proposal seeks to limit nuisance suits
through the introduction of a “settlement bar” that would allow a
defendant—facing a plaintiff unwilling to proceed to trial—to exercise
an option to have the courts refuse to enforce a settlement between the
parties.183 Denied the option to settle, plaintiffs must either withdraw
or proceed to trial.184 Since “nuisance plaintiffs” refuse to litigate to
trial, they will withdraw and not extract a settlement offer from
defendants.185 If they can no longer extract a settlement offer, it is not
rational for them to incur the costs of filing a nuisance suit and they
will not do so.186
The problem with applying this solution to public relations
litigation is that it identifies a party’s incentives for litigation and
settlement based on costs and benefits endogenous to the courts of law.
It is assumed that litigation offers one party an opportunity to impose
costs on another. It is also assumed that litigation allows a plaintiff to
reap the value of many of these costs as benefits. For example, if a
defendant pays a plaintiff a sum to settle a nuisance suit, then that sum
is a cost that the defendant undertakes but also a benefit that the
plaintiff reaps. But some benefits are provided neither by settlement
nor by judicial remedy.
Publicity associated with litigation enables plaintiffs to impose
costs on defendants that arise from the courts of law as well as costs
that arise from negative publicity, forcing the latter to sustain
monetary or nonmonetary damage that it must then incur expenses to
address.187 As an example, consider the lawsuit that Gillette filed
against ShaveLogic at an important point in the latter’s business
development. That lawsuit illustrates how courts of law offer one forum
for multi-fora battles between various types of adversaries. The shot is
fired within a legal court but the wound is felt elsewhere.
If costs are exogenous, so are benefits.188 By filing suits, parties
can incur benefits that are derived not directly from the courts of law
183. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The
Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42, 45–46 (2006).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Lauren H. Cohen & Umit G. Gurun, Buying the Verdict 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24542, 2018) (describing increased advertising and
philanthropy by defendant companies following the filing of a lawsuit).
188. See Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your Opponent in
Litigation, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 3626 (explaining the effects of plaintiff’s financial position in
defendant firm for litigation incentives).
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but instead from public opinion.189 Parties may redeem their
reputations in the wake of a scandal.190 Parties may discourage
employee flight to a competitor191 or convince companies to acquiesce to
licensing demands.192 These are benefits enabled by courts of law but
found outside it. And so long as these benefits are available, parties may
still litigate even if courts of law offer limited benefits.
3. The Litigation Privilege
The litigation privilege protects lawyers from “civil liability for
statements related to litigation which may injure or offend an opposing
party during the litigation process.”193 Historically, the privilege
protected lawyers from suits for defamation or libel, but courts have
applied it to a number of other claims as well.194 The privilege is
justified on a belief that it “preserv[es] the integrity of the advocacy
system”195 by “barring claims that would disrupt the litigation process
or deter persons engaged in that process from performing their
respective functions.”196
While the litigation privilege may reduce the risk of disrupting
the litigation process, it could simultaneously exacerbate the risk that
parties may use litigation—and litigation documents specifically—for
public relations effects. This is the fear that Blue Buffalo, a pet food
company, alleged in a lawsuit it filed against Purina in response to a
separate lawsuit that Purina filed against Blue Buffalo, which alleged
that Blue Buffalo engaged in false advertising concerning the quality of
its products.197 In its complaint, Blue Buffalo alleged that the litigation
privilege facilitated Purina’s tactics:

189. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part III.
191. See Agarwal, supra note 4, at 1367 (studying the effects that employer litigation in the
semiconductor industry might have on the mobility of employees within the industry); Ganco et
al., supra note 3, at 660 (examining how litigation by an employer might affect “employee mobility
decisions”).
192. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–4).
193. Louise Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 401 (2015).
194. T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation
Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 927–28 (2004).
195. Id. at 921.
196. Id.; see also id. at 923 (“It is recognized that the mere threat of a lawsuit may impair an
attorney’s ability to put the interests of his or her client first, especially when the attorney’s actions
may be simultaneously strengthening a cause of action for the client’s adversary.”).
197. Complaint at 1, Blue Buffalo Co. v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., No. 4:14-cv-00920 (E.D.
Mo. May 14, 2014).
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Apparently conscious of the legal risks inherent in its smear campaign, Nestlé Purina has
contemporaneously filed in this Court a spurious lawsuit in which it makes many of the
same false accusations. Nestlé Purina apparently hopes that its lawsuit will protect it
from legal action by Blue Buffalo, since statements in court papers themselves typically
enjoy a “litigation privilege.”198

Blue Buffalo’s complaint alleged that the centerpiece of the
Purina public relations campaign against it is a website—the “Honesty
Website”—that Purina launched on the very same day that it filed its
lawsuit against Blue Buffalo.199 Blue Buffalo alleged that Purina then
issued a press release announcing the lawsuit and promoted the
website via its various social media channels.200 According to Blue
Buffalo’s complaint, the website to which consumers were directed
provided links to the complaint and exhibits that Purina filed in the
lawsuit.201 The two parties eventually reached a confidential
settlement, with each side agreeing to pay its own litigation costs and
attorney’s fees.202 Additionally, Gillette tried to assert the privilege
against ShaveLogic’s counterclaims but was unsuccessful because the
counterclaims sought “to hold Gillette liable not for speech, but for
conduct.”203
These recent cases involving the litigation privilege in lawsuits
between market incumbents and new entrants suggest two things for
analyzing public relations litigation. First, it illustrates the concern
that the availability of the privilege may therefore affect plaintiff
incentives regarding public relations litigation. Second, the response of
the Massachusetts courts in the ShaveLogic litigation suggests that
this fear may be misplaced. At least some courts are on guard against
the possibility that plaintiff businesses may use the litigation privilege
as a shield to advance strategic objectives in litigation. But as discussed
above, the denial of the privilege does not prevent a plaintiff from
achieving its reputational goal; that carrot is still available.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the reputational benefits of litigation for
business litigants. Contrary to the view that litigation is usually bad for
a business’s image, this Article discussed the many ways that litigation
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id. at 13–14.
200. Id. at 5–6.
201. Id. at ex. H (Pet Food Honesty Website).
202. See Steven Trader, Purina, Blue Buffalo False Ad Fight Ends with Settlement, LAW360
(Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/859360/purina-blue-buffalo-false-ad-fight-endswith-settlement [https://perma.cc/DJ4W-LYRT].
203. Gillette Co. v. Provost, 74 N.E.3d 275, 278 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017).
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can help a corporation or other business actor by affecting its reputation
in the eyes of its key constituents. These reputational effects have real
consequences for these actors’ abilities to compete and succeed.
Litigation can bring reputational benefits even when a business
is in a crisis. While we usually view litigation as the crisis to which
public relations strategies respond, litigation itself can have public
relations effects that may be valuable in crises. The framework
provided here assists in understanding when we might expect to
witness these reputational benefits of post-crisis litigation. It explains
that these benefits depend on both proximity and organizational
similarity between the parties. Depending on these factors, litigation
can help a plaintiff with reputational repair following a crisis. In these
situations, post-crisis litigation serves both economic and informational
objectives.
It is important to understand these reputational benefits for
descriptive, normative, and policy reasons. Descriptively, reputation
helps us to understand the benefits that litigants may receive from
lawsuits that they do not win or expect to win. The value that a court
fails to provide is found outside of the court in the altered reputational
judgments of the corporate litigant’s constituents. These reputational
judgments have financial consequences for the party that can
compensate for the financial benefits that the party does not obtain
from a court.
Finally, this analysis reveals some shortcomings of the legal
rules we rely on to eliminate frivolous lawsuits. Specifically, it
highlights the disparity in the timing between the filing of reputational
lawsuits and our tools for dismissing them (or otherwise discouraging
them). In a number of situations, the reputational benefit for the
plaintiff (and corresponding injury to defendant) occurs upon filing of
the lawsuit or shortly thereafter. Even if a court dismisses a lawsuit, a
plaintiff may have achieved its reputational objective. Therefore,
strategic plaintiffs may not be deterred by these rules when they are
not primarily concerned with the fate of the lawsuit in a court; the loss
in the court of law may not matter so long as the court of public opinion
offers a “win.”

